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1 Introduction 
 
Vietnam has come a long way since the doi moi reform process was initiated in 1986. The past 
more than 15 years have witnessed one of the best performances in the world in terms of economic 
growth and poverty reduction. People’s living standards have improved significantly, and the coun-
try’s socio-economic achievements are impressive from a human development perspective. The 
commitment of the Government of Vietnam (GoV) to a process of sustained reform to underpin fu-
ture growth, poverty reduction and development was strongly confirmed in 2002 with the approval 
of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS).1 This strategy document 
was prepared following a nationwide participatory consultation process that marks an important 
milestone in the modern history of Vietnam. In addition, the GoV has increasingly taken over full 
ownership of the CPRGS as witnessed by the first CPRGS Progress Report (IDA, 2004). 
 
The CPRGS, the first Asian full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) to be approved by the 
boards of the IMF and World Bank, is built on three main pillars or sets of action:2
 
• Completing the transition to a market economy, fostering competition in the production of 
goods and services and levelling the playing field between private enterprises and State 
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
• Keeping development socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable. 
• Building modern governance, covering areas such as public financial management, public 
administration reform (PAR) and legal reform. 
 
To support the implementation of the CPRGS of the GoV and the development processes associated 
herewith, the World Bank is presently preparing its third annual Poverty Reduction Support Credit 
                                                 
1 The CPRGS was published by the Statistical Publishing House (2003) in a comprehensive volume entitled Strategies, 
Plans, Programs of Vietnam Socio-Economic Development Investment to the Year 2010. This book also includes the 
Government’s Strategy for Socio-Economic Development 2001-2010, the Five-Year Plan for Socio-Economic Devel-
opment from 2001-2005 and the Public Investment Programme (PIP) 2001-2005. In 2003 a section on large-scale infra-
structure was added to the CPRGS, see JBIC (2003). In much of the international debate and literature, strategy docu-
ments such as the CPRGS are referred to as the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (PRSP). See for example IDA 
(2004), which contains the first Annual CPRGS Progress Report of the GoV and the so-called Joint Staff Assessment 
(JSA) Report by the IMF and the World Bank. See also Danida (2003).  
2 See the Vietnam Development Report 2004 (p. 95), also referred to as the VDR 2004, prepared by Martin Rama et al. 
(2004). 
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(PRSC), to be approved by mid-2004.3 The PRSC-3 will focus on deepening the economic reforms 
and pursuing further social and institutional reforms supported by the first two PRSCs as well as the 
IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Moreover, the PRSC-3 will lay out a set of 
proposed prior policy actions for the GoV to pursue and set the scene for PRSC-4 and PRSC-5.  
 
The recent Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) by the IMF and the World Bank (IDA, 2004) of the first 
CPRGS annual progress report argues that the implementation of the CPRGS has recorded signifi-
cant successes, with key measures adopted in the macroeconomic, structural, and social as well as 
governance areas in 2002-03. Accomplishments are characterized as solid, and it is also noted that 
they are increasingly “locked in” through international agreements. It is therefore to be expected 
that the size of the annual International Development Association (IDA) poverty reduction support 
credits to Vietnam will increase in the coming years, and increasing bilateral support to the PRSCs 
is regularly referred to in official reports and statements.4
 
Together with other bilateral donors, Denmark has supported PRSC-1 and PRSC-2 with a view to 
strengthening the focus on poverty reduction in domestic policies and public sector budgets. On this 
background, Danida decided to carry out a feasibility study before embarking on future actions in 
this field. The Terms of Reference (TOR), including the scope of the work, are attached in Annex 1, 
and the present study is prepared with the following two main objectives/outputs in mind:  
 
• An assessment of the feasibility of continued multi-year budget support to Vietnam and 
supplementary support to public sector reform in support of poverty reduction. 
• Well documented/argued suggestions for possible Danish budget support and backing of 
public sector reform in support of poverty reduction. 
 
With reference to the TOR, we wish to highlight that this report was prepared awaiting the finaliza-
tion of the PRSC-3 programme to which we did not have access. We did have productive and useful 
meetings in Hanoi on the topic, but a detailed assessment of the PRSC-3 proposal was not feasible. 
The draft PRSC-matrix that is presently being negotiated comes across as a sensible instrument in 
                                                 
3 The PRSC-1 and PRSC-2 were approved by the World Bank in respectively June of 2001 and 2002. The PRSC-1 was 
relatively narrowly focused on more traditional economic reform issues, whereas the PRSC-2 addresses the broader re-
form agenda set out in the CPRGS. 
4 See for example the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) Update, presented to the Board of the World 
Bank on 19 February 2004.  
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the ongoing negotiation and stocktaking exercises between the GoV and the donor community. The 
draft matrix reflects the broad thrust of positive policy change reflected in this report, but it is ex-
plicitly being used as a very flexible and constantly changing instrument, and individual elements 
are added and subtracted continuously. This makes more definitive assessments difficult. Similarly, 
the Public Expenditure Review and Integrated Fiduciary Assessment (PER-IFA) to be implemented 
between 29 March and 16 April 2004 will undoubtedly provide further background and insights 
about fiduciary risks and public sector budget issues, which should be carefully considered by 
Danida in due course. This is so, in particular, since this exercise focuses on means to mitigate 
some of the existing risks, including a re-examination of procurement methods, and on identifying 
ways to improve transparency. 
 
As will be clear from the conclusions and recommendations set out in Section 5, we find that fur-
ther Danish support to Vietnam within the framework provided by the PRSC can be recommended 
in both the short and medium-term. This is so on several accounts, including in particular that the 
PRSC comes across as an effective and productive partnership-based tool in the policy dialogue be-
tween the GoV and the donor community. There is clearly need for a number of aid modalities in 
Vietnam to help fill the many existing resource gaps and variegated forms of investment required. 
However, in Vietnam, macroeconomic budget support can play an important catalytic role in gener-
ating a variety of learning effects with economy-wide implications. Vietnam is, in her own way, ea-
ger to learn from the international community and better public sector management and experience 
with handling budget support in its various forms can arguably go a long way in enhancing the 
overall systemic impact of the actual resource transfer, which the budget support represents.  
 
Finally, Danish budget support to Vietnam within the PRSC framework would allow Denmark im-
proved and continuous access to information and policy interaction with central government and 
multilateral donor institutions. The value of feedback effects hereof to the overall and very sizeable 
programme supported by Denmark in Vietnam should not be underestimated. This is so because ac-
cess to data and information is critical to effective aid programming and analysis in a strictly tech-
nical sense. But continued budget support could also help focus Danish efforts to take a more active 
part in policy monitoring and policy dialogue. 
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2 Growth, Poverty Alleviation and Development 
2.1  Macro-economic Framework and Macroeconomic Policies 
Vietnam has shown a remarkable growth record in the 1990s. The average annual growth rate of 
real GDP was about 6.9 percent p.a. from 1990 to 1999, implying almost a doubling of the econ-
omy. The population growth rate in the same period was modest (and declining) leading to average 
annual growth rates of real GDP per capita above five percent p.a. Even so, GNI per capita was 
US$ 430 in 2002 (using the World Bank Atlas method), placing Vietnam spot on the average of 
Low-income countries. 
 
The CPRGS formulates a set of targets for growth and poverty alleviation to be reached by 2010. 
Many of these targets are directly quantifiable and listed in the CPRGS document (Appendix 1: 
Vietnam’s Development Objectives). Even though a strict evaluation of the growth and poverty tar-
gets is premature, references to the relevant targets are given below when possible. 
Recent GDP growth and its components 
The global economic recession in the late 1990s and the financial crises in Southeast Asia, natu-
rally, had an impact on the economic performance in Vietnam. However, recovery has been fast and 
appears sustainable. From 2000 onwards annual growth rates of real GDP have been close to 7 per-
cent (Table 2.1). In addition, the preliminary recordings for 2003 and forecasts for 2004 show no 
signs of slowing down. The CPRGS growth target is to double GDP from 2000 to 2010; hence, the 
annual average growth rate should be just above 7 percent. Seen in that perspective, the recent 
growth rates are acceptable, though not outstanding. 
 
Throughout the period 1998-2002 more than half of the overall growth in GDP can be attributed to 
growth in the Non-state sector (including the FDI sector). This is not due to weak growth of value 
added in the State sector. On the contrary, in 2000 and 2002 growth rates in the State sector actually 
surpassed those of the Non-state sector. Consequently, the sector composition of GDP has been 
fairly constant with the share of the State sector remaining just around 38 percent of GDP. 
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Table 2.1: GDP growth and contributions by sector, industry, and uses (percent and percentage points) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Real GDP growth 5.8 4.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 
Contribution by economic sector      
State 2.3 1.1 3.1 3.0 2.8 
Non-state 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.2 
Contribution by industrial origin      
  Agriculture & forestry 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.9 
  Industry & construction 2.7 2.6 3.5 3.7 3.5 
  Services 2.2 1.0 2.2 2.5 2.7 
Contribution by uses      
  Total consumption 3.4 1.4 2.5 3.4 5.0 
  Gross capital formation 3.6 0.4 3.0 3.3 3.3 
  Trade balance -1.2 3.0 1.2 -0.6 -1.8 
  Statistical discrepancy -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.6 
Source: VDR 2004      
 
Value added in the agricultural sector has grown steadily during the period despite frequent calami-
ties such as droughts in the Central Highlands and flooding in the South. The CPRGS target for av-
erage annual growth of value added in the agricultural sector is 4.0-4.5 percent. Actual growth rates 
are close to this target, though in the lower end. There has been a gradual transformation of agricul-
tural production with shifts from rice paddy cultivation to fish farming and perennial crops com-
bined with intensive farming. This resulted in remarkable growth rates in value added in fisheries, 
exceeding 11 percent in 2000 and 2001. Yet, growth rates of value added in several industrial sub-
sectors match and even surpass this performance. Manufacturing and electricity & water boomed, 
with two-digit growth rates of value added in all years except for 1999. Furthermore, construction 
has picked up the pace from 2000 onwards. Hence, in general more than half of GDP growth was 
contributed by industry and construction (Table 2.1). The CPRGS target is average annual growth 
rates of 10-10.5 percent in industry and construction. Actual growth thus seems on target. In Ser-
vices, growth rates of value added show a mildly increasing tendency in the period, surpassing 6 
percent in 2001 and 2002. Here the CPRGS target is growth rates of 7-8 percent. This is ambitious, 
and above actual outcomes in the recent years.  
 
Data for the first three quarters of 2003 indicate a continuation of existing trends. Value added in 
industry and construction is expected to increase by 10 percent (annual growth rate), while value 
added in services is expected to increase by 6.5 percent. The latter is remarkable given the impact of 
the outbreak of SARS on tourism and travel industries in the spring and summer of 2003. 
 5
 Turning to the decomposition of growth by uses it is interesting to note the increasing contribution 
from consumption following the down-turn in 1999. Consumption growth rates in 2001 and 2002 
are almost back at pre-1997 levels. Despite the lower volume of investment (gross capital forma-
tion) compared to consumption, investment was equally important to growth from 2000 onwards 
with contributions around three percentage points. Moreover, the composition of growth in gross 
capital formation illustrates the transition of the Vietnamese economy (Table 2.2). The low growth 
rate of gross capital formation in 1999 was mainly due to the large decline in FDI capital from 1998 
to 1999. Even though FDI inflows were revived from 2000 onwards, the rate of growth in FDI capi-
tal is now more modest. Moreover, while investment by the State grew at high rates in 1999 and 
2000, the growth rate declined markedly in 2001 and turned negative in 2002. In contrast, the 
growth rates of Non-state financed investment were outstanding, albeit from a low base. The share 
of Non-state investment has increased from constituting about 20 percent of total investment in 
1998 to almost 29 percent in 2002. One explanation for the increase in private investment is the es-
tablishment of new private businesses. Since 1999 an average of almost 1,600 new enterprises has 
been registered each month. 
 
CIEM (2003) and Dapice (2003), among others, caution against overly optimistic assessments of 
the growth performance, in particular in the industry and construction sector. The argument is that 
the Vietnamese industry is not efficient and competitive and, furthermore, that high growth is 
mainly found in import-substitution industries benefiting from protection and demand stimulation 
policies, embarked on since 1999. The argument has some support in the data, as the growth rate of 
the value of industrial production is somewhat larger than the growth rate of value added. However, 
this result could arise from several sources. One is less efficient use of input in production. Another 
is changes in the relative price of inputs and outputs. If input prices increase relative to output 
prices, value added will not grow at the same rate as the value of production. If the entrance of new 
enterprises in the industry sector leads to increased competition the result may be that the relative 
price between input and output prices drops. Hence, it is unclear from the data on value and value 
added in industry production whether competition has weakened or not. Additional measures of 
competitiveness are needed. Another piece of “evidence” working against the poor competition hy-
pothesis is Vietnam’s increasing integration with the World economy. In 1998 total trade (imports 
plus exports) amounted to 77 percent of GDP. In 2002, the trade ratio had increased to 104 percent. 
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For comparison it can be noted that the Danish trade ratio was 70 and 82 percent in these years; 
Denmark being a small open economy. 
 
Table 2.2: Real growth rates of gross capital formation 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 Share of GCF 2002 
Gross Capital Formation 1.2 10.1 10.8 10.6 100.0 
State capital 15.5 10.7 3.9 -0.5 52.3 
Non-state capital -2.9 6.2 33.6 35.5 28.8 
FDI capital -26.3 12.4 9.2 13.6 18.8 
Source: VDR 2004 and CIEM (2003) 
 
Dapice (2003) puts forward a second argument for caution in assessing the growth performance, 
and this argument is restated in VDR 2004. Dapice and VDR claim that the high investment rate 
suggests that capital accumulation is not very productive. From 2000 to 2002 it took roughly 5 dol-
lars of investment to get 1 dollar of GDP growth. In 1995-97 the same GDP growth was obtained 
for about 3.2 dollars of investment indicating a substantial decline in investment productivity. This 
argument is based on outdated incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) calculations, which neglect 
growth contributions from changes in education (human capital) and growth in the labour force in 
addition to changes in technology. Furthermore, the numbers could instead be used to illustrate that 
the gross return on investment was 20 percent (1/5) in 2000 to 2002. This is not bad by international 
standards. Instead of simple ICOR calculations a thorough analysis of returns to investments in dif-
ferent sectors is called for if claims of unproductive capital accumulation are to be substantiated. 
The external balance 
The trade balance contributed positively to overall growth in 1999 and 2000, but since then growth 
in exports has been less than growth in imports. In addition, 2002 recorded a trade deficit, which is 
also expected in 2003 and 2004. The very high growth in exports in 1999 and 2000 was mainly due 
to oil exports, although some non-oil products such as garments and footwear also contributed. Due 
to capacity constraints, the fast increases in oil export volumes cannot be repeated in the foreseeable 
future. Consequently, even though oil prices may increase in the future, this will only have a mar-
ginal effect on the growth of export earnings. Garment exports, on the other hand, increased rapidly 
in 2002, and are expected to have increased in 2003 as well. If so, the garments sector may well 
surpass crude oil and become the most important export commodity for Vietnam. The main reason 
for the strong performance of garment exports in recent years is improved access to the US market 
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under the bilateral trade agreement (USBTA). The trade agreement has had a marked impact on the 
export market structure. The key markets in 2003 were USA (20%), Europe (20%), Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) (15%), Japan (14%) and China (14%), accounting for more 
than 80 percent of total exports. Hence, over the past few years, the US has surpassed both China 
and Japan to become the largest trading partner of Vietnam. 
 
Table 2.3: Balance of payments (US$ million) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Exports (fob) 9,365 11,540 14,449 15,027 16,076 
Imports (fob) 10,346 10,460 14,072 14,401 17,581 
Trade Balance -981 1,080 378 627 -875 
Non-Factor Services -540 -547 -615 -573 -650 
Services (net) -668 -429 -597 -634 -745 
Transfers (net) 1,122 1,185 1,477 1,251 1,900 
Current Account Balance -1,066 1,288 643 670 -370 
Capital Account 580 -337 -391 -476 835 
Medium and Long-Term 70 -423 305 383 962 
Short-term -290 -614 -1,496 -1,759 -1,227 
Direct Investment  800 700 800 900 1,100 
Errors and Omissions -47 -183 -136 0 0 
Overall Balance -534 768 116 194 465 
Note:  Figures are rounded.      
Source: VDR 2004      
 
The high growth in imports in 2002, which is expected to carry over to 2003, was mainly due to in-
creases in machinery and equipment, petroleum products and other production inputs, whereas im-
ports of consumer goods dropped slightly. Thus, the import growth was probably for a large part 
supporting the growing industry sector. 
 
The trade deficit in 2002 (2.6 percent of GDP) is expected to expand further in 2003 to 5.6 percent 
of GDP. Yet, the large net inflow of transfers (mainly remittances) makes the current account defi-
cit somewhat smaller; 1.1 percent of GDP in 2002, expanding to some 3.6 percent in 2003. The for-
eign exchange remittances probably reflect the impact of the liberalizations of regulations on for-
eign currency accounts (see below), the proclaimed policy to enhance the investment environment 
for overseas Vietnamese (including the permission to buy land) coupled with the confidence in, and 
good record of, the USBTA. 
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Macroeconomic policies 
The monetary policy as conducted by the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) has changed over the recent 
period. Since 1999, the monetary policy has been aimed at adjusting the credit and foreign ex-
change regimes to make them more flexible and responsive to market signals. The aim is to main-
tain monetary stability while at the same time supporting economic growth. In July 2000, the SBV 
started open market operations (OMO), and the frequency of OMO transactions has increased from 
once every ten days in 2000 to twice a week since May 2002. Interest rate regulations have also 
changed. In June 2001 the lending interest rate for foreign currency denominated loans was liberal-
ized, and in June 2002 the SBV removed the ceiling on domestic currency loans.5
 
Table 2.4: Monetary survey 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
  Percentage change from beginning of year 
Trillion Dong end of 2002 
Net Foreign Assets 49.5 97.8 56.4 22.9 -0.1 117.5 
Net Domestic Assets 15.0 13.7 28.2 27.5 -16.2 211.7 
       
Credit to the economy 16.4 19.3 38.1 21.4 22.2 231.1 
  Claims on State enterprises 21.7 9.7 28.7 14.1 12.2 89.5 
  Claims on other sectors 11.2 29.8 46.9 27.5 29.5 141.6 
Broad money (M2) 24.0 39.1 39.0 25.5 17.6 329.1 
Source: VDR 2004       
 
The somewhat “liberal” monetary policy in 1999 and 2000 with growth rates of credit and broad 
money (M2) approaching 40 percent year-on-year was replaced by a more “conservative” policy in 
2001 (Table 2.4). Moreover, credit to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) was restrained in line with 
the programme supported by the IMF. Over the period, credit to SOEs has declined from 50 percent 
of total credit in 1998 and 1999 to 38 percent in 2002. 
 
Inflation rates have been declining from 1998 to 2001, with deflationary tendencies in 2000 and 
2001, followed by an increase in 2002 (Table 2.5). Yet, the rate of inflation is nowhere near the 
level of the high inflation period in the early 1990s. The implicit deflators from the National Ac-
count largely follow this tendency, although not recording the decline in prices. Hence, the rapid 
                                                 
5 The interest rates for foreign exchange deposits of enterprises at Commercial Banks (CBs) and those of CBs at the 
SBV are still regulated. 
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growth in monetary aggregates has supported monetary deepening of the economy and strong credit 
demand, without leading to inflationary pressure. 
 
Table 2.5: Measures of inflation 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Consumer retail price index 7.8 4.3 -1.6 -0.4 4.0 
Implicit GDP deflator 8.8 5.7 3.4 1.9 4.1 
Implicit deflator for total consumption 8.4 4.6 3.3 1.7 4.1 
Implicit deflator for gross capital formation  4.9 4.1 7.5 3.6 3.7 
Source: VDR 2004      
 
The main problem in the financial sector is the quality of lending of the State Owned Commercial 
Banks (SOCBs) and the fraction of non-performing loans (NPLs) in total credit. Exact data for the 
volume of NPLs are difficult to come by; however, some estimates show that NPLs from SOCBs 
amounted to VND 23 trillion in 2000. This equals 5 percent of GDP. A separation of policy-based 
lending from the SOCBs was initiated in 2000 by the creation of the Vietnam Bank for Social Poli-
cies (VBSP) and the Development Assistance Fund (DAF). Policy-based lending through DAF has 
been growing rapidly and DAF is becoming one of the biggest financial institutions in Vietnam. 
Outside evaluations and reviews of DAF-operations are therefore desirable and should be seen as an 
integral part of the reconstruction of the financial sector. 
 
The budget deficit has been increasing from 1998 to 2001 (Table 2.6). However, the deficit is small 
relative to GDP in all years. The deficit is expected to rise in 2003 in part because of a 38 percent 
increase in wages and pensions. The budget revenue is around 20 percent of GDP, whereas grants 
are about 0.5 percent. The 2000 public expenditure review (PER 2000, see World Bank, 2000) 
noted the declining revenue (1998-1999) and called for revenue increases. As seen from Table 2.6 
revenues have increased more than GDP from 2000 onwards. In particular the tax revenue from 
non-SOEs has increased. Unfortunately, it is trade related revenues (i.e., import taxes and duties) 
that have grown the most, and the main revenue components continue to be transfers from SOEs 
(including all taxes, operating surpluses and operating fees) and tax on external trade. Both of these 
revenue sources are under pressure in the reform process. Hence, reform of the tax system remains 
a policy issue that merits attention. However, given the priority, which the GoV has for many years 
assigned to fiscal discipline, it is expected that proper measures will be taken by the GoV to ensure 
the future sustainability of public budgets. 
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 Table 2.6: State budget revenue and expenditure (percentage of GDP) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002/e 
Revenue and Grants 20.2 19.6 20.6 21.6 22.2 
  Tax Revenue (non-SOEs) 8.7 9.0 7.8 8.3 9.6 
    Non-state Sector 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.4 
    External Trade 4.5 5.2 4.3 4.8 5.9 
    Joint Ventures 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 
  Transfers from SOEs 8.0 8.0 10.2 10.8 10.0 
  Other Non-Tax Revenue 2.9 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.2 
  Grants 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Total Expenditure 20.7 21.2 23.4 24.8 24.9 
  Current Expenditure (exc. Interest) 14.5 13.2 15.1 15.1 14.7 
    Wages and Salaries 6.2 5.8 6.7 7.5 6.9 
    Other 8.3 7.4 8.4 8.1 7.8 
Capital Expenditure 5.7 7.4 6.7 8.4 8.2 
Overall Balance -0.5 -1.6 -2.8 -3.2 -2.7 
Source: VDR 2004      
 
On the expenditure side, it is noteworthy that capital expenditure has been increasing from 2000 
onwards without a similar increase in non-wage current expenditure. The share of capital expendi-
ture in total expenditure has increased from 27 percent in 1998 to 33 percent in 2002 while non-
wage current expenditure fell from 40 to 31 percent. The PER 2000 called for a better balance be-
tween capital and current expenditure, but this has not been addressed in the 2000-2002 period. As 
stated in VDR 2003 (World Bank, 2002); the level of public expenditure is less of a concern than its 
allocation. 
 
Table 2.7: External debt and debt services (US$ million, unless otherwise indicated) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Debt outstanding   19,874   20,481   11,581    11,433  12,165 
Official creditors                     15,446   16,818     8,679      9,170  10,503 
Private creditors                        4,428     3,663     2,902      2,263  1,662 
Debt services      
Public Debt Service/XGS         9.2       10.1         7.6         6.8       6.0 
Public Debt Service/GDP         4.0         4.9         4.2         3.7       3.3 
Note: Figures are rounded. From 2000 onwards, data reflect the rescheduling of non-convertible Russian debt. 
Source: VDR 2004 
 
The real importance of Vietnam’s stock of external debt was difficult to assess during the 1990s as 
most of the external borrowing was from the Soviet Union and former socialist bloc prior to 1991. 
However, in September 2000, Russia and Vietnam agreed on a debt-rescheduling scheme by which 
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Vietnam repays US$ 1.7 billion over 23 years with an interest rate of 5 percent p.a. The reschedul-
ing almost halved the external debt outstanding (Table 2.7). Since then, the debt has been fairly 
constant. Most of the external debt is on concessional terms; resulting in low interest rates and 
fairly low debt service ratios, well below HIPC thresholds.  
Box 2.1: Public debt dynamics, 2002-2008 
 
Gross debt of the general government is projected to increase from 36 percent of GDP in 2002 to about 
51 percent of GDP in 2007, declining thereafter. The projection allows for a budget deficit of 2½ percent 
of GDP over the medium term, debt creation of some 7 percent of GDP to recapitalize SOCBs and restruc-
ture SOEs, and new lending via the DAF averaging 2½ percent of GDP annually.  
Public Debt Dynamics 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 (In percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated) 
Assumptions 
  Budget deficit 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
  Onlending 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.0 1.9
    ODA-financed 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2
    Domestic-financed 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.7
  Debt issues for SOE/SOCB reform 1.1 2.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public debt stock 35.7 39.4 44.9 50.1 51.0 51.0 50.9
Change in debt stock ratio 3.7 5.5 5.2 0.9 0.0 -0.2
  o/w Onlending 3.0 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.0 1.9
         Debt issues for restructuring 1.1 2.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
Memorandum Items 
Assets from new onlending 1/ 3.0 5.8 8.0 9.9 11.0 11.9
Public debt stock sensitivity test 
  with 3% deficit from 2005 onward 35.7 39.4 44.9 50.6 51.9 52.3 52.5
  with doubling of reform costs 35.7 39.4 47.6 57.0 57.3 56.7 55.9
Source: MoF, DAF, and Fund staff estimates.       
1/ Nominal value of onlending portfolio.        
   
The main driver of gross debt stocks in this projection is lending by the DAF, through which ODA-
financed onlending is routed and which also undertakes lending financed (outside the budgetary framework) 
by domestic borrowing. The budgetary burden of these lending operations will depend crucially on the quality 
of the lending and whether final borrowers can service their debts. With full repayment on post-2002 loans, 
DAF assets of some 12 percent of GDP in 2008 would fully service the corresponding debt; with zero repay-
ment, this debt burden would fall fully on the budget.    
The second determinant is the assumed cost of SOCB recapitalization and SOE restructuring, some 7 
percent of GDP in these projections. Estimates of SOCB recapitalization costs are based on 2000 audits of 
the main SOCBs, plus assumptions on the pace (15 percent annually) and quality (5 percent loan loss provi-
sioning) of new credit extension and a capital-adequacy target of 5 percent; estimates of SOE reform costs, 
such as for redundancy payments, are official estimates, made in 2001. With a doubling of SOE/SOCB re-
form costs, the peak in debt levels would exceed the baseline by some 6½ points of GDP.  
This scenario assumes lending quality problems are significantly contained, ensuring that the pressures 
of maintaining a 2½ percent budget deficit are manageable; in “worse case scenarios”, where the budget has 
to finance the bulk of DAF debt service, and reform costs rise sharply because of bad loans (SOCBs) and 
soft budget constraints (SOEs), this assumption would not be acceptable.  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2003a). 
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Even though IMF debt projections indicate an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 36 percent in 
2002 to 50-51 percent in 2005-2008, mainly due to SOE/SOCB reform related lending operations 
and debt issuance, the HIPC debt-indicators are still well below threshold values (Box 2.1). Hence, 
there is no expectation of unsustainable development in external debt. 
State Owned Enterprises 
SOEs play a leading role in the Vietnamese economy, in particular in industry (e.g., coffee, sea-
food, cement, garments and textiles, and paper and steel) and selected services such as energy, fi-
nance, telecommunication and transport. The share of SOEs in industrial production was 45 percent 
in 1998 declining to 40 percent in 2002 (Table 2.8). In export, the importance has decreased at a 
stronger pace, though from a higher initial level. In 2002, the SOE share of non-oil exports was 35 
percent, down from 62 percent in 1998. As noted above, there has been a decline in bank credit to 
the SOE sector such that the sector accounts for 38 percent of total credit to the economy in 2002. 
However, credit from DAF has increased since its creation in 2000 whereby total credit to the SOE 
sector remained at 40-50 percent in 2002.  
 
Table 2.8: The role of the SOE sector in the economy 
Percentage share of SOEs in 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Industrial output 45 43 41 41 40 
Non-oil exports 62 54 48 44 35 
Bank credit   45 42 38 
Bank and DAF credit   50 48 46 
Source: GSO (2004), IMF (2003b) and Larsen et al. (2003) 
 
The general perception of the SOE problem is that of poor governance and lack of hard budget con-
straints resulting in meagre and deteriorating financial conditions. The prime example of loss-
making SOEs is the sugar mills, where the sugar programme initiated in 1995 resulted in construc-
tion of 32 new mills adding to the 12 existing mills. The World Bank estimates that by 2000 none 
of the 44 mills could cover their capital costs. In paper and steel sectors SOEs are likewise loss-
making with increasing debt. Not all SOEs are in bad shape though. In the oil/gas and aviation sec-
tors SOEs are reporting large profits, probably due to limited competition. But also in the garment 
and textiles sector, SOEs are profitable and expanding. However, SOEs in this sector will face in-
creased competition as accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) moves closer. 
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Reforming the SOEs has been a gradual process, initiated in the early 1990s and further enhanced 
in 1997, 2001 and 2003/4. The pace of reform of the SOEs is probably the most problematic part of 
Vietnam’s transformation to a socialist-oriented market-based economy. The outside view of the 
process is that it has been too slow and uneven. The reform is not one of outright privatization, al-
though small SOEs have been liquidated, sold, leased or assigned to their workers, largely from 
2000 onwards. The main reform mechanism is equtization whereby some or all of the state capital 
in the enterprise is sold in the form of shares at a price based on the book value of the assets. Direc-
tors and employees are given preferential treatment as purchasers of these shares, and they have of-
ten bought them all. The equity cannot be traded within a three year period, unless special permis-
sion is granted. Of the 288 transformations of SOEs in 2001, 200 were equitisations; 17 were sold; 
41 were assigned to workers while 30 were liquidated. Since the beginning of 2001 some 70 per-
cent of the equitisations have involved the sale of more than 65 percent of the equity to non-state 
shareholders. Throughout, the typical transformed SOE has been quite small. In 2001, 244 of the 
transformed enterprises had chartered capital of less than VND 10 billion. In fact, from 2000 to 
2002 the number of SOEs with chartered capital of more than VND 50 billion has increased from 
1216 to 1600 (GSO, 2004). 
 
Table 2.9: Number and size indicators of SOEs and the transformation 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of SOEs 1/ 5,861 5,713 5,759 5,355 5,364 
Total transformations 102 242 250 288 242 
Total creations 87 94 74 43 8 
Average employees per enterprise   363 395 421 
Share of loss-making SOEs (percent)   17.45 16.69 14.67 
Average loss (VND million)   3,283 3,815 4,043 
Average gain (VND million)     4,597 5,544 6,546 
1/ For 1998-99 the numbers are from IMF (2003) for 2000-2002 they are from GSO (2004). 
Source: GSO (2004), IMF (2003b) and Larsen et al. (2003) 
 
GSO (2004) also reports the number of loss- and gain-making enterprises in the years 2000-2002 
based on comprehensive enterprise surveys. According to Vietnamese accounting standards, less 
than 20 percent of the SOEs are loss-making (Table 2.9) while the average loss per enterprise has 
increased from VND 3,283 million in 2000 to VND 4,030 million in 2002 resulting in a total loss of 
VND 3,171 billion in 2002. In contrast, the average gain was VND 6,546 million, and as the num-
ber of gainers vastly exceeds the number of loss-makers, the total gain in the SOE sector was VND 
29,131 billion in 2002, yielding a net-gain (total profit before taxes) in the sector of VND 25,960 
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billion. For comparison GSO reports that 20.4 percent of the non-state enterprises had losses, with 
an average loss of VND 80 billion in 2002. The average gain was VND 115 million. 
 
With due reservations for the Vietnamese accounting standards, these numbers call for more in-
depth analysis of the SOE sector before the dysfunctional nature of the sector as a whole can be es-
tablished as a stylized fact. Yet, this is not an argument against further and increased speed of the 
reform of the sector. 
 
In sum, the problem in the SOE sector seems not to be as much a problem with losses on current 
operations as a problem of past and future operations. As discussed above in relation to monetary 
policy, the share of NPLs from SOCBs is estimated to be some 5 percent of GDP. Identification and 
adequate transformation of the “non-performing SOEs”, hence, appear to be a better target for the 
SOE reform process than mere transformation counting. Furthermore, in relation to future reforms, 
a discussion of the role of SOEs in the Vietnamese economy also appears more relevant than setting 
targets for the number of transformations. Of course, many of the small SOEs could in all likeli-
hood be transformed quickly once the problems of vested interest and diffidence are overcome at 
the enterprise level. But a road map describing the desired division of future private and public sec-
tor activities will be a better goal. This may seem ambitious, but partnership and policy dialogue 
should be able to help establish a mutually understood vision for the future, which respects the par-
ticular conditions of Vietnam without putting economic rationality and profitability at risk. 
 
2.2  Poverty and its Reduction 
Vietnam’s growth record is remarkable but even so, many would claim that it is surpassed by the 
achievements in poverty reduction. From 1993 to 2002, the share of the population living in poverty 
fell from 58 to 29 percent; cutting poverty in half in ten years. The achievements have not been uni-
form across Vietnam or across ethnic groups, and there are signs of a slight decrease in the speed of 
progress, but this should not be taken as a critique of the progress achieved so far. 
 
Vietnam has fairly good data on poverty, based on household surveys in 1993, 1998 and 2002. In 
addition to the household surveys the Poverty Task Force (PTF) conducted participatory poverty 
assessments in the preparation of VDR 2004. Hence, the present poverty situation in Vietnam ap-
pears well documented. The 2002 Vietnam household survey (VHLSS) was produced by GSO, 
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which will continue in the future with surveys every second year. The future surveys are expected 
to revisit many of the same households as in the 2002 survey, resulting in a panel-structure that is of 
particular interest for analyses of poverty dynamics. The household surveys provide detailed ex-
penditure data that can be used to illustrate and analyze poverty and inequality over time and place. 
Detailed analyses of the situation in 1998/99 are given in Minot et al. (2003) while VDR 2004 pro-
vides a detailed update to 2002. Below a brief summary of some of the main findings in these re-
ports is given. 
 
The GSO poverty line in Vietnam is defined as the cost of a consumption basket, which includes 
food and non-food items, with food spending being large enough to secure 2,100 calories per day 
per person. A person is considered poor if the income or expenditure level is not high enough to af-
ford the consumption basket. The fraction of the population considered poor by this definition de-
fines the poverty rate (also denoted the incidence of poverty). In some households, expenditure or 
income is below the cost of the food part of the consumption basket (also referred to as the food 
poverty line). The fraction of the population below the food poverty line is denoted the food pov-
erty rate. 
 
The poverty rate in Vietnam declined from 58 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 1998 and further to 
29 percent in 2002; an annual average decline of more than 3 percentage points (Table 2.10). Pov-
erty reduction was fastest in 1993-98 (average annual decline of 4 percentage points) while some-
what lower in the latter period (average annual decline of 2 percentage points). A similar pattern 
can be noted for food poverty, where the average annual rates of decline are about half of the de-
clines in the poverty rates. In 2002, about one third of the poor were below the food poverty line. 
Poverty reduction has been strongest in urban areas leading to a widening gap between urban and 
rural poverty rates. Yet, the recorded poverty in urban areas may be biased downwards as illegal 
migrants are not covered by the household surveys. Even so, it is worth noting that food poverty has 
been almost eliminated in urban areas. 
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Table 2.10: Poverty rates 1993, 1998 and 2002 
 Poverty rate  Food poverty rate 
  Total Urban Rural  Total Urban Rural 
1993 58.1 25.1 66.4  24.9 7.9 29.1 
1998 37.4 9.2 45.5  15.0 2.5 18.6 
2002 28.9 6.6 35.6  10.9 1.9 13.6 
Source: VDR 2004 
 
Combining the growth record and poverty reduction underscores the pro-poor nature of the growth 
process in Vietnam. The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita was 6.9 percent in the pe-
riod 1993-98 and 4.9 percent in 1998-2002. The poverty rate declined by 9.0 and 6.1 percent in the 
same periods, indicating growth elasticities (percent decline in poverty / percent growth) of 1.3 and 
1.2, respectively. This is clearly above average in developing countries; the average being (roughly) 
one. 
Geographical patterns of poverty 
Both the level and rate of decline of the poverty rate vary strongly across regions even though all 
regions have experienced marked reductions (Table 2.11). The incidence of poverty is highest in the 
Central Highlands and the Northern Mountains followed by the North Central Coast. The two deltas 
(Red River Delta and Mekong Delta), the South Central Cost and the South East are the areas with 
poverty rates below the national average.6
 
Table 2.11: Poverty rates across regions 
  1993 1998 2002 
Total Poverty rate 58.1 37.4 28.9 
Northern Mountains 81.5 64.2 43.9 
  North East 86.1 62.0 38.4 
  North West 81.0 73.4 68.0 
Red River Delta 62.7 29.3 22.4 
North Central Coast 74.5 48.1 43.9 
South Central Coast 47.2 34.5 25.2 
Central Highlands 70.0 52.4 51.8 
South East 37.0 12.2 10.6 
Mekong Delta 47.1 36.9 23.4 
Source: VDR 2004 
 
                                                 
6 The regional classification has changed over time. In particular, three poor provinces from the South Central Cost and 
the Central Highlands were remapped to the South East between 1998 and 2002. The remapping contributed to the slow 
reduction in poverty in the Central Highlands and the South East. 
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The split of the Northern Mountains into North East and North West reveals very different 
achievements. The North West had a lower poverty rate than the North East in 1993, but whereas 
poverty reduction has been rapid in the North East, the North West remained almost stagnant from 
1998 to 2002. In 2002, the North West is by far the region with the highest incidence of poverty. 
 
The Inter-Ministerial Poverty Mapping Task Force has combined the 1998 VLSS with census data 
for 1999 to provide a detailed geographical mapping of poverty. It is possible to analyze poverty 
and inequality, along with other background data at the commune level. However, the statistical 
precision at the commune level is not overwhelming, which is why the spatial distribution of pov-
erty is probably best analyzed at the region, province and district levels. 
 
Figure 2.1: The geographical distribution of poverty rates and poverty densities 
 
        Source: Minot at al. (2003) CD-ROM. 
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 The map on the left-hand side of Figure 2.1 shows the estimated poverty rates at the district level in 
1998/1999. The additional information compared to Table 2.11 is the dispersion of poverty rates 
within some of the regions. In particular the North West and North East regions have large varia-
tion, even though most districts in the North West have poverty rates above 80 percent; save Son 
La, which had an estimated poverty rate just below 40 percent in 1998. 
 
The map on the right-hand side of Figure 2.1 shows the location of the poor. It is interesting to note 
the difference in the density and the incidence of the poor which is caused by the variation in popu-
lation density. Most of the poor in 1998/99 were located in the two deltas and along the costal 
plains whereas districts in the North West and North East, with the highest incidences of poverty, 
have low densities. 
 
The different distribution of poverty incidence and density has prompted a discussion of pro-poor 
policies and programmes between the Inter-Ministerial Poverty Mapping Task Force (IMPMTF, 
2003) and the Poverty Task Force as indicated in VDR 2004. The question is whether policies and 
programmes should target areas with high poverty incidence or high poverty density, the latter be-
ing relatively rich areas. VDR 2004 provides an update of the densities, at the regional level, show-
ing that the contribution to national poverty is declining in the two deltas (Table 2.12). In 1998, 39 
percent of the poor lived in the Red River Delta and the Mekong Delta; by 2002 this share had 
dropped to 34 percent. In contrast, the share of poor people in the Northern Mountains, North Cen-
tral Coast and the Central Highlands increased from 48 percent in 1998 to 52 percent in 2002. 
 
Table 2.12: Percentage distribution of the poor and of the population 
 The poor  The population 
(Percent of total) 1993 1998 2002  2002 
Northern Mountains 23 25 22  15 
  North East 19 20 16  12 
  North West 4 6 7  3 
Red River Delta 24 18 17  22 
North Central Coast 16 18 20  13 
South Central Coast 5 8 7  8 
Central Highlands 3 5 10  6 
South East 11 5 5  15 
Mekong Delta 17 21 17  21 
Source: VDR 2004 
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While this development provides arguments against concentrating the effort in (relatively rich) ar-
eas with high poverty density, it may still be cost efficient to target some programmes towards the 
one third of the poor living in the two deltas. Furthermore, the argument does not address the prob-
lem of the districts in the North West. The North West has by far the highest poverty incidence, yet 
in 2002 only 7 percent of the poor and 3 percent of the population lived in these districts. 
Poverty and ethnicity 
Poverty varies across ethnic groups, and the share of ethnic minorities (i.e., non-Kinh and non-
Chinese) among the poor has increased from 20 percent in 1993 to more than 30 percent in 2002. 
This trend is even stronger when looking at food poverty rates. The decline in poverty rates has thus 
not been as rapid for the ethnic minorities as for the Kinh and Chinese. In fact the food poverty rate 
has been stagnant from 1998 to 2002 among ethnic minorities (Table 2.13). Even among the ethnic 
minorities there is considerable variation in poverty rates, but the main difference is still between 
the Kinh and Chinese, on the one hand, and the other ethnic groups on the other (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2: Poverty rates across ethnic groups in 2002 
 
                 Source: VDR 2004 
 
The reduction in poverty rates in Table 2.13, combined with a forecast of future poverty reduction 
indicates that by 2010 more than one third of the poor in Vietnam will be from an ethnic minority 
group. According to VDR 2004, this calls for further analyses of the poverty amongst ethnic groups 
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and for updates of the poverty reduction strategies to attack the many dimensions of “ethnic back-
wardness”. 
Ethnic and geographical distribution of poverty 
Even though the severity of ethnic poverty is clear, the root cause is not. First of all, the vast major-
ity of ethnic minority people are farmers. As such, they belong to a poor segment of the population. 
Using the rural poverty rate for comparative purposes therefore seems in many circumstances more 
appropriate than using the overall poverty rate. Moreover, four of the six poorest ethnic groups are 
in the Central Highlands (Ba-na, Gia-rai, E-de and Co-Ho) and two are in the Northern Mountains 
(H’mong and Muong). Hence, the poorest minorities are located in the poorest parts of the rural ar-
eas. This suggests that the ethnic minorities are poor for a variety of reasons, which may all be rele-
vant when focus is on designing and implementing appropriate poverty reducing policies.  
 
Table 2.13: Poverty rates across ethnic groups 
 Poverty rate  Food poverty 
  Total Kinh and Chinese Ethnic minorities  Total Kinh and Chinese Ethnic minorities 
1993 58.1 53.9 86.4  24.9 20.8 52.0 
1998 37.4 31.1 75.2  15.0 10.6 41.8 
2002 28.9 23.1 69.3  10.9 6.5 41.5 
Source: VDR 2004 
 
Figure 2.3 shows a clear correspondence between the percentage share of Kinh in the population 
and the poverty rate across districts in 1998/99. These observations confirm that it is very difficult 
to disentangle geographical and ethnic variations in poverty rates. Moreover, the evolution of ethnic 
poverty rates varies considerably across geographical regions. 
 
The minority groups in the Northern Mountains have seen steady declines in poverty rates (from 
almost 90 to about 66 percent) and in the Mekong Delta minority poverty rates dropped from 75 to 
just above 50 percent. In the Central Highlands the ethnic poverty rate declined from 1993 to 1998 
and then increased to just above 80 percent. However, the Central Highlands as such had a rela-
tively poor record compared to the other regions. In sum, it is not clear whether the high poverty 
rates among ethnic groups are primarily an ethnicity problem or a geographical problem, and it can 
be noted that the targeted programmes, to which reference will be made in subsequent sections of 
this report, are not defined with reference to ethnicity per se. 
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 Figure 2.3: The geographical distribution of poverty pates and Kinh population shares in 1998/99 
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              Source: Inter-Ministerial Poverty Mapping Task Force (2003), CD-ROM 
 
 
A view to future poverty reduction 
The CPRGS target for poverty is to reduce the poverty rate by 40 percent according to international 
standards and by 60 percent by national standards from 2000 to 2010. The VDR 2004 illustrates 
some possible outcomes under different assumptions about the growth impact on poverty reduction. 
Assuming that real GDP grows by 7 percent per year—as is necessary if the target of doubling GDP 
from 2000 to 2010 is to hold—and that population grows by 1.35 percent p.a., the resulting growth 
of real GDP per capita is 5.65 percent. If, furthermore, poverty declines by 1.3 percent for each one 
percentage point of per capita growth, as it did in the 1993-98 period, then the annual reduction of 
the poverty rate is 7.2 percent. A second possibility, based on the 1998-2002 observations, is that 
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poverty “only” declines by 1.2 percent for each percentage point per capita growth. In this case the 
poverty reduction amounts to 6.7 percent per year. A third approach uses the disaggregated expen-
diture data from the 1998 and 2002 surveys to take account of the variations in the growth rates in 
average expenditure per capita across ethnic and non-ethnic groups across provinces, coupled with 
the assumption of an overall per capita GDP growth rate of 5.65 percent p.a. This disaggregated ap-
proach yields an overall poverty elasticity of 0.8. Projections of the three scenarios are given in 
Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4: Projections of the poverty rate 2000-2010 
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 Source: VDR 2004 and authors calculations 
 
The two projections using growth elasticities of 1.3 and 1.2 result in very similar forecasts of the 
poverty reduction from 2000 to 2010, and both show that the CPRGS target can be reached, as pov-
erty is halved over the period. The disaggregated projection, denoted “Forward looking approach” 
in the figure, highlights a possible path in which the target is missed (though by a small margin). 
Furthermore, the disaggregated approach underlines the need for further analysis of – and policy ac-
tions towards – poverty reduction amongst rural ethnic minorities. 
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3 Socio-Economic Reforms and Governance 
3.1 Background 
As is clear from Section 2, Vietnam has come a long way since the doi moi reform process was ini-
tiated in 1986. Wide-ranging socio-economic and institutional reforms have been introduced, in-
cluding a greater reliance on market forces in the allocation of resources and in the determination of 
prices. A shift from an economy dominated by the state and co-operative sectors to a situation 
where the private sector and foreign investment account for a relatively high proportion of GDP is 
visible. Overall, important strides have been made over a relatively short time span to further the 
transition from a centrally planned to a socialist market economy. 
 
In parallel with the domestic reforms, Vietnam has initiated a process of opening up its economy to 
regional and global economic forces that will shape the international economic environment in 
which the future growth process of Vietnam will have to take place. Vietnam joined the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, and is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Co-operation (APEC). The central economic and trade programme of co-operation for ASEAN is 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and AFTA’s key instrument is a Common Effective Prefer-
ential Tariff (CEPT). By joining ASEAN, Vietnam has undertaken international commitments in 
the area of trade policy that are bound to have an impact on opportunities for economic develop-
ment. This is particularly so in light of the intense competition that characterises today’s global 
markets, and the rapid evolution in science and technology. Assessing the impact of trade policy 
and formulating appropriate policy responses is a critical area of the reform process, especially 
since it is a central objective of the GoV to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) as early as 
possible, with the end of 2005 as the current goal. 
 
The progress achieved over the past more than 15 years is remarkable in the modern history of 
Vietnam; and viewed in this perspective, the commitment of the GoV to overcome the legacies of 
the past and put the country on a stable path of growth, poverty alleviation and broad-based devel-
opment, cannot be disputed. Yet, it is also clear that Vietnam faces tremendous challenges. Vietnam 
remains a poor country according to the Human Development Index (HDI),7 and structural and in-
                                                 
7 Vietnam is ranked as number 109 using the UNDP Human Development Index (UNDP, 2003). 
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stitutional reforms still to be addressed are by no means simple and straightforward.8 The same 
goes for the search for how best to organise and facilitate a socialist-oriented market economy, ar-
ticulated as an overarching goal at the Ninth Party Congress in April of 2001.  
 
In subsequent sections (grouped according to the three pillars of the CPRGS) a somewhat more de-
tailed assessment of the reform process over the past few years and an identification of risks and 
challenges in the coming years are given. Focus is on the PRSC process and performance in light of 
the PRSC-3 triggers, presented in the PRSC-2 programme document. Table 3.1 provides the sum-
mary overview of these triggers. It is recalled that triggers should be seen as well-defined mile-
stones, benchmarks, policy actions or indicators, which regulate the move from one PRSC to the 
next.9 It follows that performance as measured against these triggers is important in establishing 
whether the next PRSC should be pursued at the low, base or high case scenario in terms of IDA 
support. Moreover, in case of unsatisfactory performance, the PRSC should be discontinued or at 
least seriously reconsidered.  
 
It is characteristic, however, that performance evaluation is complex as indicators and topics actu-
ally focused on vary,10 and it is not entirely clear how the PRSC modality relates to more traditional 
conditionality, compliance and reward mechanisms. It would appear that emphasis in practice in the 
PRSC process in Vietnam has so far been more on stocktaking than on continuous and long-run 
forward looking interaction. This suggests that there is scope for investing more time and resources 
in the policy dialogue among the multilateral and bilateral donors associated with the PRSC, and 
this is so at both macro and sector levels. As regards the latter, further development of the policy 
dialogue in the PRSC sub-groups (see Section 4) may help contribute in a constructive manner to 
furthering a balanced build-up of plans and action programmes from “below”.  
                                                 
8 In October of 2003, the Executive Directors of the IMF concluded the Article IV consultation with Vietnam. The Ex-
ecutive Directors commended the Vietnamese authorities for their strong success in achieving high growth and poverty 
reduction based on prudent macroeconomic management, transition to a more market-oriented economy and increased 
integration into the global economy. The Executive Directors also drew attention to pending issues concerning for ex-
ample the compliance of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) with the IMF safeguards policy on preparation, audit and 
publication of central banks’ statements.  
9 As stated in World Bank (2003), triggers help the World Bank and the Government to anticipate critical next steps in 
the relevant areas of reform.  They provide benchmarks against which to objectively evaluate progress on reforms and 
the readiness to move forward with the next operation.  
10 The detailed content of the PRSC policy matrix has been constantly changing and while the broad focus in the latest 
draft PRSC-3 matrix is in accordance with the assessments put forward in the present report, the various collaborating 
partners are still exercising influence on the final outcome. This also means that the matrix is in effect a rather mixed 
bag of initiatives, some of more fundamental nature than others. 
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 Table 3.1: Monitorable indicators 
Related to CPRGS Pillar I Trigger for PRSC 3 
• Private sector development • Number of new formal sector enterprises registered 
• State-owned enterprise reform • Share of new credit going to state-owned enterprises 
• Progress in resolution of inter-enterprise debts 
• Financial sector reform • Progress in resolution of non-performing loans 
• Progress in operational framework for DAF 
Related to CPRGS Pillar II Trigger for PRSC 3 
• Poverty and hunger alleviation • Proportion of people living below the poverty line 
• Proportion of people living below the food poverty line 
• Education • Net primary school enrollment rate 
• Gender and ethnicity gaps in net primary enrollment rates 
• Proportion of children in full-day schooling at primary level 
• Land • Submission of a bill for the revision of the Land Law, supporting land-
tenure security, customary land-use practices and access to land for all 
sectors 
• Environmental sustainability • Proportion of population with access to clean water and sanitation ser-
vices 
Related to CPRGS Pillar III Trigger for PRSC 3 
• Planning processes • Progress in implementation of CPRGS planning processes in one sector  
• Progress in implementation of CPRGS planning processes in several 
provinces 
• Public financial management • Progress in the set up of an integrated Treasury and Budget Manage-
ment Information System 
• Legal development • Publication of legal documents in the Official Gazette 
Source: World Bank (2003). 
 
Finally, there is by way of background reason to highlight that the GoV has outlined a rather elabo-
rate set of indicators to monitor the implementation of the CPRGS. Progress towards meeting 
CPRGS strategic objectives and the local version of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals 
(MDG), known as the Vietnam Development Goals (VDG), see Cat Van Thanh (2003), is in princi-
ple measured by no less that 134 indicators, although in practice a smaller sub-set is relied on.11
                                                 
11 The document on the VDG was prepared in the CPRGS inter-ministerial working unit. It provides a detailed and 
comprehensive list of 134 indicators, definitions and data sources grouped as follows: A1: Economic Growth, A2: Re-
source Mobilization for Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction, A3: Resource Effectiveness, B1: Poverty Reduc-
tion, B2: Infrastructure, B3: Job Generation, B4: Compulsory Education, B5: Fertility, Child Mortality, and Child Mal-
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It is clearly beyond the scope of the present report to assess all of these in detail, but this is an area 
where future technical assistance would probably be beneficial with a view to ensuring a high de-
gree of clarity and relevance in the monitoring and evaluation effort by both the GoV and the inter-
national donor community. Strengthening the capacity for data analysis and the subsequent formu-
lation of adequate policy advice is clearly needed across a wide range of institutions and actors in 
the Vietnamese reform process, including those concerned with the design and implementation of 
the PRSCs. 
 
3.2 Economic Transition and Reform (CPRGS Pillar 1) 
Reviewing the 2002-03 CPRGS annual progress report, there is ample evidence that the implemen-
tation of the CPRGS has so far been encouraging in the more traditional areas of economic reform. 
The JSA of the World Bank and the IMF (IDA, 2004) refers to significant successes, and it is stated 
that key measures continue to be adopted in the macroeconomic and structural areas (i.e. in CPRGS 
Pillar 1). The following paragraphs illustrate the present situation. 
Private sector development 
The new Enterprise Law, implemented in January 2000, was an important milestone in the Viet-
namese reform effort. In a briefing note prepared by the Central Institute of Economic Management 
(CIEM, 2002), the enterprise law is characterized as a key for future job creation, and it is emphati-
cally stated that “The wind of change is blowing in Vietnam, and nowhere is this more evident than 
in its private sector”. The enterprise law marked the explicit desire of the GoV to improve the cli-
mate for private businesses and establish a level playing field between the state and private sectors 
of the economy;12 and by now the formal private sector employs more people than the entire SOE 
sector. Moreover, as noted in Section 2, the number of new registered private enterprises continues 
to be high, and the GoV has also unified the corporate income tax at 28 percent. This implies that 
income taxes became irrespective of ownership as of January 2004. All in all, an active process of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
nutrition, B6: Health, HIV/AIDS, Epidemic and Social Diseases, B7: Information and Culture, B8: National Culture, 
B9: Sustainable Environmental Protection, B10: Vulnerability reduction, B11: Gender Equality, and B12: Good Gov-
ernance. 
12 At present enterprises that are fully owned by the State operate under the Law on State Owned Enterprises, but a uni-
fied law is presently being drafted by CIEM. In this process, the particular social and responsibilities often assigned to 
SOEs should not be overlooked. 
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removing impediments to private sector development is unfolding and the investment climate has 
definitely been improved.  
SOE-reform 
The Ninth Party Congress held in 2001 established a variety of goals related to SOE reform. They 
focus on fostering greater competition in output markets and on hardening the budget constraint 
rather than on outright divestiture. The strategy also includes divestiture of non-strategic enterprises 
(mainly through equtization) and a move towards autonomous decision-making and enhanced ac-
countability in enterprises that remain under state ownership. A well defined (and publicly avail-
able) road map for SOE equtization, sale etc. has been established and while the number of trans-
formations in 2003 fell far short of this plan progress is as fast as ever before (Larsen et al., 2003) 
and plans for the future are well defined. Diagnostic audits also continue and, as shown in Section 
2, the share of the SOE sector in the economy (as measured by the share of SOEs in GDP, exports 
or new banking credit) is on a downward trend while state sector efficiency is on the increase. 
Overall, while SOE reform continues to be contentious, it appears that the GoV is moving slowly, 
but decisively in the direction agreed upon, and a Decree on monitoring and evaluating SOEs was 
issued in December of 2003 as a confirmation hereof. This is expected to lead to an explicit classi-
fication of SOEs depending on profitability etc. A complex area still to be addressed relates to inter-
enterprise debt, which in turn is closely embedded in the financial sector reform initiative. 
Financial sector reform 
Progress in the financial sector reform area is falling behind original plans, interlinked as it is with 
SOE reforms. Progress in the resolution of the issue of non-performing loans is therefore sluggish. 
Nevertheless, it would appear that about 30 percent of the stock of NPLs (identified in December 
2000) has been resolved (Larsen et al., 2003), and as part of existing restructuring plans, loans have 
by now been reclassified based on norms that are close to international standards. Efforts are also 
being made to improve capabilities and accounting practices in the SOCBs, and there are clearly ef-
forts by the GoV to streamline the regulatory framework for policy lending, including the areas of 
activity of the DAF. Much remains to be done in this area, and the transparency of the system re-
mains somewhat clouded, but it should be kept in mind that the donor community is actively en-
gaged in key areas of the reform process as set out in the informal Vietnam – Partnership for De-
velopment report presented in December at the Consultative Group meeting for Vietnam (Bo Thi 
Hong Mai, 2003). 
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 3.3 Social Equity and Sustainable Development (CPRGS Pillar 2) 
The excellent performance of Vietnam when it comes to poverty and hunger alleviation is well es-
tablished and documented as shown in Section 2, and evidence suggests that the public expenditure 
programme of the GoV plays an important redistributive role (PER 2000 and VDR 2004). On this 
ground budget support appears well justified. Nevertheless, while education spending as a share of 
Government expenditures has been on a steady increase, public health outlays are somewhat low 
and have been falling as a share of total recurrent Government expenditure. 
The falling share of the health sector has started to attract more attention in the policy dialogue,13 
and it may seem paradoxical that health indicators in Vietnam are generally better than should be 
expected for a country as poor in income terms as Vietnam.14  
 
Targeting of public health spending has improved over time and total public social expenditures are 
more equally distributed than household expenditures. However, the large share of health care and 
education spending financed by individuals or households has inherent inequalities. The burden of 
user charges on poor households in health and education is high, and the system of exemption from 
some fees and charges does not appear to operate in a pro-poor way. Moreover, the high level of 
expenditure on curative health programmes is inequitable, as much of this is focussed on hospitals, 
which have disproportionately large numbers of users from the more affluent sections of the com-
munity. There are also clear variations among provinces in terms of quantity and quality in the de-
livery of minimum services. These province-wise differences are linked to per capita public spend-
ing disparities stemming in part from differences in access to user fee and insurance-funded reve-
nues. Disparities also result from central government resources that are neither well targeted on 
poor areas nor directed sufficiently to commune health sectors and other facilities used more by the 
poor, but went to hospitals instead. 
 
In response to this situation, more resources for health services at the provincial level are currently 
in the process of being secured, through Decree 10 and Decision 139, which are still being fleshed-
out and road tested. Decree 10 takes aim at the functioning of the system at the facility level. When 
                                                 
13 Note that health did not, in fact, appear as one of the trigger areas in the PRSC-2 programme document. 
14 The total fertility rate is 2.4 as against an average for low-income countries of 3.8, and contraceptive prevalence is 
high at 75 percent as compared to 23 percent for low-income countries. However, choice is limited and abortion is 
widely relied on. The number of births attended by skilled medical staff is 77 percent.  
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fully implemented, it would give hospital managers much greater control over their budgets as well 
as greater through still constrained discretion regarding pay and employment issues, user charging 
for non-basic services and domestic borrowing. 
 
Decision 139, issued in October 2002, entails a major increase in health spending with an additional 
VND 700 billion notably allocated for 2003. This measure requires provinces to use the Health 
Care Funds for the Poor (HCFPs), set up with central resources, to either buy health insurance cards 
for the poor and other disadvantaged groups, enrolling them in the social health insurance pro-
gramme, or to pay directly for the costs of services supplied to the beneficiaries by hospitals and 
possibly other public providers. This should lead to improved service utilization, especially inpa-
tient care for which fees, drug outlays and other costs can be prohibitively expensive without insur-
ance coverage, and Decision 139 can be tightly targeted on the poor. Out-of-pocket health spending 
and purely precautionary savings should fall for those individuals covered by this measure, freeing 
up resources for spending on food, shelter and other goods and services.  
 
It would appear that this is an area to which Danida may wish to pay particular attention. It is a 
promising avenue to sustain the poverty reduction achieved in recent years, and it is widely agreed 
that much can be achieved by revamping the targeted alleviation programmes. In general terms, this 
should be done in a way that expands their coverage of the poor, reduces leakage to the non-poor, 
strengthens the management of resources, and gives more responsibility to communities in the de-
sign and supervision of the local components. 
 
In relation to other recent developments in the health sector, it is encouraging that the official con-
cern about increased HIV/Aids prevalence has become more vocal and visible. A 10-year strategy 
to address this problem has been drafted by a newly established National Committee, as evidence 
hereof, and the effective response of the GoV to the SARS crisis underlines that the GoV is taking 
the health situation and related social and economic implications seriously. 
 
Turning to the social areas that were explicitly listed in the summary overview of trigger areas in 
the PRSC-2 programme document, alongside poverty and hunger alleviation, the following high-
lights are illustrative of developments over the past few years. 
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Education 
Vietnam has been making rapid progress in increasing educational enrolments at all levels and im-
proving the efficiency and equity of public spending. The gender gap in enrolment and attainment 
has basically been closed. The female/male education ratio is for example 1.0 for net primary en-
rolment, and primary enrolment rates now exceed 90 percent, except for ethnic minorities and the 
poorest quintile of the population.15 Moreover, the 10-year strategy for education is consistent with 
international development goals. Finally, social safety nets have been designed to avoid any bias 
against women. 
 
Targeting of education spending has improved over time and, according to VLSS 1998, the poorest 
quintile receives 18 percent of total public education expenditures and 26 percent of primary educa-
tion expenditures. This is promising in international comparative perspective, but the level of costs 
borne by parents, both directly and through fees is high, and the current system of exemption from 
fees does not seem pro-poor. There are also issues of varying quality of the education actually pro-
vided, and higher education is largely restricted to those who can afford to pay. Systemic reform 
with a view to promote efficiency and equity of the education system as a whole therefore remains a 
challenge. 
 
The commitment of the GoV to quality of education to all segments of the population is under-
scored by the recent adoption of a national Education for All (EFA) strategy. Moreover, the Fun-
damental School Quality Levels (FSQL), adopted in 38 provinces under the programme Public 
Education for Disadvantaged Children, is promising, especially since disadvantaged children are 
among the poorest in Vietnam. Expectations are that by 2006, at least 40 percent of the education-
ally disadvantaged zones will receive Government support to move towards the FSQL level, and 
schools that receive FSQL investments will eliminate many of the charges which currently burden 
poor families. 
Land 
The new Land Law passed on 7 November 2003 represents a distinct expression of the commitment 
of the GoV to establish an enabling environment for a market economy. The adopted land law sets 
up a legal framework for addressing land-tenure security, customary land-use practices and access 
                                                 
15 However, the greatest improvements in participation rates have been in the lower income groups. 
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to land for all sectors, including minority groups relying on customary land use practices. The rights 
of these groups have been a concern in the PRSC process, and the advances noted are no doubt di-
rectly linked with the PRSC policy dialogue. The law also specifies that Land-Use Right Certifi-
cates (LUCs) should bear the names of both spouses, promoting equal access to land use, as well as 
access to credit since LUCs can be used as collateral. The challenge in the coming period will be to 
follow-up the law with all the necessary circulars and guidelines so it becomes a daily reality. 
Environmental sustainability 
The key initiative in this area has been the drafting of a circular by the Ministry of Planning and In-
vestment (MPI) on the implementation of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) of large pro-
jects so as to promote Vietnam’s capacity to implement Agenda 21. The newly established Ministry 
of Natural Resources and the Environment is the new focal point for action in this area, which will 
assume responsibility for issuing the necessary detailed regulations. 
 
3.4 Governance and Public Sector Management (CPRGS Pillar 3) 
The third pillar of the CPRGS is concerned with building modern governance, and over the past 
few years there has been noticeable progress in public expenditure management. Specific comments 
with reference to Table 3.1 follow below. 
Planning processes 
The GoV recognizes that a major effort is needed to roll out the CPRGS to the provinces, and sev-
eral activities have already been undertaken in this respect. They include a series of workshops and 
a set of Regional Poverty Assessments (RPAs), which provide qualitative insights into local poverty 
conditions. This process is likely to continue, so the CPRGS policy matrix will undoubtedly step by 
step acquire a more central position in development planning and implementation. In this regard, it 
appears that improved synchronization of the CPRGS and the Five- and Ten-Year plans would be 
desirable, but there is arguably a need for both the domestic planning documents and the CPRGS. 
They serve different purposes and audiences, and they are elaborated under different types of con-
straints. As such they have complementary – rather than competing – roles to play in the develop-
ment process in Vietnam and the related interactions with the international community.  
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Public financial management 
The 1996 State Budget Law established a clear and generally sound set of “rules of the game” for 
resource allocation and resource use. A revised State Budget Law was approved by the National 
Assembly in December 202 and came into force in January 2004. The new law consolidates and 
builds on recent efforts to promote fiscal transparency and accountability, such as Decision 
182/2001/QD-TT allowing for more detailed publication of final accounts for 2000 and the budget 
plan for 2002 and providing an enforcement mechanism to make communes post their budgets out-
side offices. Henceforth, budgets will be published as soon as they are approved, along with all pro-
cedures and regulations. The State Budget will cover all expenditure components including defence 
and national security (budget lines that were previously a State secret) beginning from the fiscal 
year 2005. Moreover, the National Assembly is given powers to decide detailed appropriations for 
Ministries and transfers to provinces, a clear improvement compared to previously where they only 
approved allocations at the sector level. It should also be noted that the CFAA from 2002 concludes 
that the public financial management system of Vietnam compares well with those of other coun-
tries. In addition the GoV has expressed its full agreement with all of the main recommendations. 
 
Significant weaknesses remain, however, in the management system. Vietnam lacks even a simple 
mechanism for monitoring the outputs and outcomes of public spending and for feeding this infor-
mation back into future resource allocation decisions. The existing mechanisms for incorporating 
economic and sectoral analysis are weak and there is a growing mismatch between capital expendi-
ture and operations and maintenance expenditure in many sectors. The absence of a credible multi-
year fiscal framework means that expenditure planning is conducted without reference to agreed 
medium-term resource constraints and prioritization is carried out separately for capital spending 
and for recurrent spending. 
 
Weaknesses in transparency and accountability also continue to exist. Final accounts are not avail-
able for up to 18 months after the end of the fiscal year and there remain many inaccuracies in the 
data. The published data remain at a high level of aggregation and even line ministries have diffi-
culty in assessing more detailed data on sector spending at province and district level. The still less 
than fully consolidated budget makes it difficult to monitor total revenues and expenditures, as well 
as the true fiscal position. Extra-budgetary funds, on-lent ODA and much of commune-level spend-
ing are not consolidated into the budget. Inspection of the budget and end-year accounts by the 
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State Audit and by the National Assembly has strengthened in recent years, but major deficiencies 
remain.  
 
The GoV is working to pilot Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) in four pilot sectors; 
education, health, transport and agriculture/rural development, and in four pilot provinces. This will 
be complemented with an overreaching, higher-level Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF). At 
the same time, efforts are being made to establish a first generation performance budgeting system. 
Moreover, the GoV recently launched a major procurement exercise for a net Treasury and Budget 
Management Information System, which will greatly strengthen its ability to manage and to moni-
tor in an accurate, detailed and timely manner how resource are used at central and local level. 
Legal development 
The foundation for Vietnam’s legal reform strategy was laid down in a Legal Needs Assessment 
(LNA) in 2002 and a legal systems development strategy with detailed action plans has been devel-
oped on this basis. The 2004 legislative agenda for the National Assembly will focus on Vietnam’s 
legal framework for WTO requirements, but an ambitious law programme has been outlined by the 
National Assembly for the period 2004-2007. Many of these actions are bound to have a profound 
effect on the Vietnamese society, including issues such as transparency, people’s participation and 
access to justice. 
 
3.5 Summing-up and Critical Issues 
While Vietnam’s achievements in terms of poverty reduction are one of the greatest successes in 
economic development, growing inequality has been experienced in recent years, particularly be-
tween rural and urban populations, between ethnic minorities and the majority Kinh and Chinese 
groups, between poor and wealthy regions, and within growing cities (see Section 2). The remain-
ing poverty, both in marginalized areas and within growing regions, is a formidable challenge. One 
reason for this is accession to the WTO, which is likely to involve considerable structural shifts that 
are difficult to predict, and a process where there will be both winners and losers. Attention to the 
particular needs of groups of people, including women and children, with low level human and 
physical capacity endowments and limited capacity to respond in a changing economic environment 
will be a key to continued progress. While gender imbalances are less pronounced in Vietnam than 
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in many other places,16 and gender equality and freedom from violence are guaranteed under the 
law, attitudes perpetuating inequality and domestic violence persist in most communities, and in in-
stitutions entrusted with overseeing and implementing the law. Moreover, there are no women in 
the Politburo and the Secretariat, the top levels of the Party and Government. Some 26 percent of 
the National Assembly members are women, but at local levels of government and party structures 
the share ranges between only 5 and 20 percent. 
 
In spite of concerted efforts to promote private sector development and enterprise over the past few 
years, there is need for continued support to further the process of transition to a market economy. 
Particular attention should in this regard be paid to deepening the understanding of the constraints 
facing the Small and Medium Scale Enterprise (SME) sector and defining programmes of action to 
address these. The donor community can undoubtedly play a constructive role here. It also appears 
as an important ingredient of the reform process to try to better the climate for enterprise develop-
ment, including a level playing field so private agencies can compete on an equal footing with state 
companies.17  
 
In the policy dialogue between the GoV and the donor community, slow-moving progress in the 
area of SOE and financial sector reforms has played a critical role and has no doubt fuelled skepti-
cism about the intentions and will of the GoV. There is reason to continue focusing on the need for 
introducing hard budget constraints and streamlining the financial sector. Delivering on this double 
agenda would be beneficial. At the same time, it should be kept in mind throughout that these re-
forms are complex and if not handled in an appropriate manner could lead to highly undesired im-
plications as witnessed from other reform processes elsewhere in the world. The GoV appears 
committed to continue moving in the right direction and, as such, it would be advisable to insist on 
continued progress rather than on unrealistic speeding up of the pace of reform. In any case, the 
SOE sector should be assessed on economic and financial grounds, and in this area the situation in 
Vietnam may not be as uniformly dismal as sometimes pictured. While some SOEs are certainly in-
efficient others have in fact contributed to industrial development as discussed in Section 2. In-
creased transparency in providing financial information and regulatory progress in this area and in 
the financial reform area are likely candidates for productive focal areas in the policy dialogue. 
                                                 
16 The female labour participation rate is 86 percent, for example. 
17 It can be noted that CIEM has been assigned responsibility for drafting (before the end of 2004) legislation to pro-
mote this goal. 
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 Government expenditure on education and training and on health services does appear to have a 
pro-poor bias; however, there is ample room for improvements. There is therefore reason to monitor 
the developments in this area closely, and the forthcoming PER-IFA should contribute to further in-
sights in this area. The same can be said for the establishment of MTEFs, and initiatives to reduce 
formal and informal out-of-pocket expenses of poor people, which can have a variety of undesirable 
systemic effects, deserve careful attention as do policies geared towards ensuring appropriate qual-
ity and service levels in poor areas. Finally, attention to HIV/Aids is rightly attracting attention as 
an important issue in defining appropriate health policies. 
 
There is a clear awareness in Vietnam of the need to build capacity for sustainable resource man-
agement, pollution prevention and control, and prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. How-
ever, actual resource allocation to environmental management remains low, and the GoV continues 
to face a series of well-known trade-offs when economic and environmental dimensions of devel-
opment have to be assessed. This is a complex challenge, but greater awareness of issues involved 
and the environmental implications of economic choices is an appropriate way to approach these. 
The same goes for the need to turn recent regulatory improvements in relation to land into reality. 
While it is commendable that the legal framework has just been modified to provide equal access to 
assets, practice has so far been that only men’s names are registered on land titles. This has reduced 
the access of women to mortgage based credit markets and limited their economic possibilities. All 
of this underlines the importance of continued attention to these cross-cutting challenges, including 
proper monitoring, analysis and evaluation. 
 
Planning processes in Vietnam continue to reflect a high degree of centralization and the political 
single-party system remains undisputed. Efforts have been made to disseminate CPRGS processes 
to provincial and local authorities, but there is a clear need for increased attention to “bottom-up” 
planning and for greater synchronization of the CPRGS and more traditional planning processes. 
The Public Investment Programme (PIP) and the initiatives foreseen in the CPRGS is a case in 
point. Vietnam is allocating substantial resources to public investment, but at present the PIP re-
mains largely a compilation of projects, which are inadequately screened and assessed within a 
comprehensive development framework. It is hoped that the recent inclusion of an infrastructure 
chapter in the CPRGS can help improve coordination between the CPRGS and the Five- and Ten-
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Year Plans, but there is arguably a need for both the domestic planning documents and the CPRGS. 
They serve as noted different purposes and audiences. In any case, concerted action will be required 
to promote proper involvement of local level authorities and people in rolling out the CPRGS as 
discussed in the VDR 2004. 
 
Public financial management continues to be non-transparent and much remains to be done in this 
area in spite of recent progress. Donors are well advised of the existence of a variety of fiduciary 
risks, but the forthcoming PER-IFA could play a critical role in contributing an up-to-date assess-
ment and lay out detailed proposals for future actions. Particular attention could in this context be 
paid to the need for concrete accounting and auditing standards, reporting practices and proposals 
for how they can be put into practice in a timely and realistic manner. The same goes for a variety 
of initiatives related to the struggle against corruption. While it is not entirely evident that corrup-
tion is as widespread and destructive as sometimes depicted, it is clear that corruption remains an 
issue in Vietnam and that attention needs to be paid to pursuing concrete steps towards curtailing it 
as much as possible. Some of the recent steps in enacting punitive measures are to be noted but the 
systemic aspects can only be addressed through greater transparency and popular control. 
 
Democracy and human rights is an issue in relation to Vietnam and although a signatory party to 
the UN convention on Civil and Political Rights, the situation regarding freedom of opinion, as-
sembly and association and the right to protection against abuse remains unsatisfactory. Yet, it 
would appear that the long-term trend is positive, and human rights are receiving greater accep-
tance, and the present process of increased transparency, publishing laws etc. is an appropriate one. 
Even so, it should not be overlooked that the room for open critique and debate is limited. Here 
again, it is clear that the GoV will have to carry out a careful balancing act between various inter-
ests and forces in the Vietnamese society and the donor community. 
 
In sum, the GoV is faced with many intricate issues, but reviewing experiences so far gives reason 
to state that it does appear that the necessary political will exists to keep the reform process moving 
forward in spite of the difficulties listed. Reviewing the efforts over the past few years, there is no 
doubt that ambitions have often been pitched at rather optimistic levels. Yet, institutional reforms 
are by their very nature difficult in a context such as that of Vietnam. It would therefore be advis-
able that donors keep focused on whether the trends in the reform process stay on track rather than 
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on the level of individual criteria used in the assessments. Overall, this effort could undoubtedly be 
improved by a more concerted focus on better and more consistent monitoring of the reform effort 
in its many dimensions. 
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4 Aid Flows and Aid Management 
4.1 Aid Patterns18 
Vietnam received only limited amounts of aid from OECD member countries during the 1980s 
where Soviet assistance was prominent. However, with the downfall of the former USSR, normali-
zation of relations with the USA and other Western countries, and the initiation of the doi moi re-
form process in 1986, Vietnam became an attractive destination for Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) from the OECD donor group.  This was so on social and economic as well as political 
and strategic grounds as argued by Bartholomew and Lister (2002). They also emphasize that doi 
moi was initiated before the upsurge in ODA which only began in the late 1980s, so reform was 
neither imposed from outside nor “bought” with aid. Aid may in the Vietnamese context be per-
ceived as a reward for the reform initiative, but it did not bring doi moi about. 
 
Donor support for Vietnam’s development and reform policies remains strong. Recent estimates 
suggest that ODA disbursements reached a level of more than US$ 1.5 billion in 2003, correspond-
ing to some 20 US$ per person, about  4.5 percent of GDP, and some 20 percent of total govern-
ment revenue. This makes Vietnam an important programme country to many donors, including 
Denmark. 
 
ODA-flows rose more than five-fold during the decade from 1993 and they have by now recovered 
to the record level achieved in 2000 after a temporary decline in 2001 (Figure 4.1).19 Most of the 
longer-term increase in disbursements is accounted for by loans rather than grants, and loans now 
account for about two-third of the ODA inflows.  
 
Japan has for years been the largest donor, in 2002 followed by the World Bank, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, France and the IMF (Figure 4.2). Denmark was sixth in 2002 and therefore a key bi-
lateral donor.  
 
                                                 
18 This section draws on UNDP (2002), UNDP (2003), Bartholomew and Lister (2002), Lister (2003) and Bartholo-
mew and Lister (2004). We are grateful to Anne Brolev for support in obtaining the data used. 
19 Disbursements in 2001 fell some 16 percent following eight years of consecutive increases. The decrease was due 
largely to the completion of a number of Japanese financed projects and programmes, including the Phu My, Pha Lai, 
and Ham Thuan Da power plants, as well as the Miyazawa Initiative, which was in support of private sector develop-
ment, and SOE and trade reform. 
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Figure 4.1: Annual ODA disbursements 
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Figure 4.2: Top 10 donors in 2002 
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As is clear from Figure 4.3, the most important type of aid in 2002 continues to be traditional capi-
tal investment projects, representing almost 60 percent of ODA disbursements. Free standing tech-
nical assistance was second with 28 percent. Quick disbursing aid both in the form of balance of 
payments support and programme aid represented some 20 percent of total ODA in 2001, but this 
share fell to only 10 percent in 2002. 
 
Figure 4.3: ODA disbursement by type 1998-2002 
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The drop in quick disbursing aid in 2002 is related in part to the fact that the no payments were 
made as expected under the third tranche under the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PRGF) due to the need to revise SBV audit and accounting procedures. Moreover, the second and 
final tranche of the World Bank supported PRSC-2 was only disbursed in early 2003. IMF and 
World Bank support is particularly aimed at supporting banking sector and SOE reform, private 
sector promotion, social and rural development and good governance. 
 
With the increase in more general purpose, quick disbursing ODA facilities over time, the effec-
tiveness of ODA will increasingly depend on the overall quality of general public expenditures. 
Here, the quality of the Public Investment Programme (PIP) as well as recurrent expenditures on 
Education and Health will be important. 
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The importance of capital investment projects as the major type of aid corresponds quite closely 
with the sectoral distribution reflected in Figure 4.4. Major infrastructure was a critically important 
sector and in 2002 recovered from the decline in 2001 to account for no less than 46 percent of total 
ODA disbursed. Under infrastructure, transport has acquired a dominating role, whereas the share 
of drinking water and sanitation has fallen considerably as compared to the first half of the 1990s, 
reflecting that needs are much better fulfilled than before.  
 
Figure 4.4: Broad ODA trends 1993-2002 
Source: UNDP (2003) 
 
 
Another characteristic of ODA to which the UNDP (2003) draws attention is that disbursements 
towards rural development clearly lag behind the increasing demand of funds (Figure 4.4). Yet, af-
ter a brief decline in 2001, ODA directed towards human resource development registered an im-
portant increase of 21 percent in 2002, returning to the increasing trend experienced since 1993. 
This is well justified. The biggest challenge to further poverty reduction and improving well-being 
in the future will be to break down isolation in its various forms so the poorest of the poor can bet-
ter join into the development process.  
 
Among other categories, it is clear that balance of payments and budgetary support together with 
policy and institutional support have emerged as important types of aid.  
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 Figure 4.5: Donor support to "economic management" (excluding World Bank and IMF) and "development 
administration" – 2001 disbursements 
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Note: World Bank and IMF support to “Economic management” amount to 86 percent of total support to this 
category. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 confirms that most donors are active in economic management and development admini-
stration, and Denmark is evidently an important actor in these categories. Economic management 
refers to assistance to macroeconomic, fiscal, monetary, and employment policy and planning, and 
development administration refers to public administration, foreign aid coordination, debt manage-
ment, technology policy, general statistics, general cartography and foreign affairs and international 
law (UNDP 2003).20 Consequently, the donor community is deeply involved in the economic re-
form process in a great number of areas with substantial resources. 
 
Finally, turning to the regional distribution of foreign aid, some 42 percent of ODA in 2002 was 
disbursed to the benefit of Vietnam as a whole through central government agencies. The remaining 
58 percent of ODA disbursements can be directly attributed to specific provinces. This allocation is 
shown in Table 4.1. 
 
                                                 
20 It is highlighted that the term “development administration” is used here in accordance with the UNDP source. De-
velopment administration is a donor concept that should not be interpreted as related to foreign aid only, but to a wide 
variety of public activities necessary for the administration of development processes. 
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Recent increases in aid appear to have been spread relatively evenly across the country, although 
the South Central Cost seems to be somewhat favoured while the North Central Cost is overlooked 
when measured by the share of population, the share of poor households and the regional poverty 
rates. In absolute terms, the Read River Delta received the largest fraction overall. However, ex-
cluding Hanoi, the largest share went to the Northern Mountains followed by the South Central 
Cost and the South East. Looking at ODA per capita, there is a fairly even distribution across the 
regions, save the extremes, Hanoi and the Mekong Delta. The South Central Coast, the Central 
Highlands and the Northern Mountains received the largest flows in per capita terms. Apart from 
the South Central Coast and the North Central Coast, this corresponds reasonably well with the re-
gional poverty rates and poverty densities. In sum, good reasons should be given for the high dis-
bursements to the South Central Coast at the expense of the much poorer North Central Coast, but 
that apart, the regional distribution does not appear unreasonable from the criteria in focus above. 
 
Table 4.1: Regional distribution of ODA allocated to specific provinces and urban authorities in 2002 
Region ODA (US$ million) 
Pct. share of 
provincial al-
location 
Pct. of popula-
tion 
Poverty 
density 
Poverty 
rates 
ODA per 
capita (US$) 
Northern Mountains 161.2 20 15 22 43.9 12.3 
Red River Delta 164.3 20.4 22 17 22.4 11.1 
Excluding Ha Noi 91.8 11.4 19    7.5 
North Central Coast  84.5 10.5 13 20 43.9 8.4 
South Central Coast 121.4 15.1 8 7 25.2 15.0 
Central Highlands 62.3 7.7 6 10 51.8 15.3 
South East 104 12.9 15 5 10.6 10.2 
Excluding HCMC 62.6 7.8 8    12.2 
Mekong Delta 108.3 13.4 21 17 23.4 6.7 
Total 806 100.0 100 100 28.9 10.5 
Source: UNDP (2003), Table 2.11 and 2.12. 
Note: Errors due to rounding occur. 
 
Danish aid to Vietnam 
The overall objective of Danish aid to Vietnam is to support Vietnam in its efforts to promote social 
and economic development to the benefit of the poorest groups of people. The cooperation between 
Denmark and Vietnam was reactivated in 1993, and at the time it was agreed that focus should be 
on water, fisheries and agriculture. In the building up of programme support in these three areas 
much has been achieved, but the collaboration has also reflected that programme support is a rela-
tively new form of aid where much remains to be learned on both the donor and the recipient side.  
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 Recent reviews have confirmed the importance of the sector priorities, but considering the critical 
importance of the economic reform process as a precondition for continued growth and poverty re-
duction Danish support to the reform process in economic management and development admini-
stration has been gradually increased. This has been done both with a view to economic policy re-
form more specifically and to good governance and administrative reforms more broadly, including 
human and legal rights and democratization.  
 
Examples of these types of activities include support to: 
• Auditing of SOEs and GCs 
• The National Enterprise Reform Committee (NERC) 
• The Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) 
• Administrative reforms in Dak Lak province 
• Legal reforms (Office of the National Assembly, the Supreme People’s Courts and the Su-
preme People’s Procuracy) 
• National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) 
• Reforms in the Office of the Government (OOG) 
 
Vietnam is also one of the countries where attention to the environment has been a prominent char-
acteristic of Danish aid. The same goes for the increasing focus on private sector development and 
support to a local grant facility as well as the so-called ferry project. 
 
The local grant authority covers a variety of smaller projects (each of less than DKK 3 million) un-
der the local approval authority of the Danish Embassy. Typical projects are: technical assistance to 
the State Bank of Vietnam for international accounting standards, financial audit of VietCombank, 
rights promotion for ethnic minority development, legal needs assessment, Son La poverty reduc-
tion pilot project, the Danish fund for the promotion of gender equality in Vietnam (2001-2003), a 
seminar on the convention against torture, support from Denmark to strengthening the capacity of 
Thai Binh province for community involvement and client participation in population and reproduc-
tive health, and Dak Lak equtization pilot project.  
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The total Danish aid disbursed in 2002 amounted to approximately DKK 321 million, and the sector 
distribution of the Danish support is shown in Figure 4.6. Danish support to the PRSC process is 
not reflected in these figures but accounted for in disbursement figures for 2001 and 2003.  
Figure 4.6: Sector allocation of Danish bilateral aid in 2002 
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4.2 Aid Management and Aid Instruments 
A total of 25 bilateral donor countries, some 20 multilateral donor agencies, and nearly 400 interna-
tional NGOs operate in Vietnam with substantially different procedures and disbursement criteria. 
The management of this system is therefore no simple task, especially as the number of donors and 
the amount of aid resources have been increasing quite significantly. This is reinforced by the lack 
of transparency that is still characteristic for the way in which Vietnamese public finances are man-
aged. 
 
Primary institutional responsibility for aid management rests with the Ministry of Planning and In-
vestment (MPI). MPI has the overall coordinating role, but the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the 
Office of the Government (OOG) play important supplementary roles. The State Bank of Vietnam 
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(SBV) coordinates general budget support and serves as counterpart to the IMF and the World Bank 
in the implementation of the PRGF and the PRSCs. 
 
The tradition of central planning remains at the very core of the Vietnamese aid management sys-
tem, and the lack of socio-economic screening and appraisal of projects is a critical shortcoming of 
the system. Moreover, only large-scale projects are included in the Public Investment Programme 
(PIP), which does not provide the coherent overview required to be able to prioritize in a transpar-
ent manner. The PIP does not consider recurrent costs, so trade-offs between recurrent and invest-
ment expenditures are hard to address. This highlights the need for establishing as soon as possible 
a set of MTEFs at both the macroeconomic and sector levels. 
 
All the major sector ministries have departments for international cooperation, and in practice there 
is sometimes scope for negotiation between donors and line ministries in project development. Yet, 
broad priorities must be kept in mind, and all new initiatives as well as minor project revisions re-
quire the approval of the MPI. Approval procedures can therefore be quite cumbersome. The same 
goes for project implementation where a large number of Project Management Units (PMUs) con-
tinue to play a key role. They clearly form part of the “consensus governance” model in Vietnam 
where focus is on internal rather than external processes of accountability and transparency, but this 
does add to the complexities of the aid relationship between Vietnam and her donors. Finally, while 
the Vietnamese state and budget are unitary, decentralisation has increasingly given provincial and 
district bodies a more important role in the coordination and implementation of aid projects at local 
level. 
Structures of dialogue and coordination 
On the above background an elaborate institutional framework for coordination and dialogue be-
tween the GoV and the international donor community has evolved. A Consultative Group (CG) 
Meeting has taken place annually since 1994, and since 1998 Mid-Year Meetings have also been 
held. These meetings give the GoV and the donors the opportunity to review recent developments 
and jointly address emerging challenges.  
 
The CG framework is by no means unique to Vietnam, but it has as noted by Bartholomew and 
Lister (2004) spawned a large set of more than 20 sectoral “partnership groups” of varying degree 
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of formality. Some focus on particular sectors such as banking and transport, others on cross-cutting 
issues, including poverty, gender and the environment.  Participants are drawn from government 
and the donor and NGO communities. The aims of these groups also differ and a variety of ap-
proaches have been developed depending on the needs and circumstances of the group. Some 
groups have donor representatives only and serve mainly as information-sharing forums.  Some of 
the informal groups also have government representatives joining meetings, as well as representa-
tives of non-state agencies. The structure gets more formal when government has a lead role and fi-
nancial resources are made available.  
 
At the same time, the aid relationship in Vietnam is somewhat paradoxical. Two salient paradoxes 
identified by Bartholomew and Lister (2002) are: 
• Political versus economic liberalisation. Political liberalisation has moved much more slowly 
than economic reform, which has been cautious and incremental. A long list of “governance” is-
sues remain to be addressed as discussed in Sections 2 and 3, both in terms of for example the 
economic management of SOEs and with reference to the broader governance agenda. 
• The contrast between donors’ appreciation of the GoV’s broad strategy and policies and their 
relatively low assessment of the degree of transparency and standards of public administration. 
In many areas there appears to be a high degree of trust between the GoV and the donors on 
policy, but low trust on GoV financial management. 
 
All of this evidently has a bearing on the kinds of aid modalities that are perceived as the most ap-
propriate. 
Aid modalities: pro et contra 
There is a continuing debate in the aid literature on the relative merits of project versus programme 
aid. In recent years this distinction has admittedly become rather blurred, as various intermediate 
forms of aid have evolved, but it is evident that the project component of aid budgets started declin-
ing from the early 1980s across the developing world. Other instruments have gradually grown in 
importance, such as policy-conditioned programme aid (e.g. structural adjustment lending in the 
form of balance-of-payments and budget support), support for the private sector, NGO support, 
emergency assistance and technical assistance and cooperation.  
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There has also been a move towards sector programme aid, which is strongly reflected in the Dan-
ish aid programme in Vietnam, and the international donor community is clearly in a process of ex-
perimentation with a view to increasing aid effectiveness and improving the dialogue both between 
donors and recipients and amongst donors. All of this represents an appreciation of the need to be 
able to respond quickly to unforeseen circumstances and shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis. 
It can also potentially facilitate donor coordination to achieve an appropriate balance within sectors, 
across sectors within the economy and at the macroeconomic level. Increased understanding of how 
donor supported investment activities are linked in coherent programmes should also further more 
effective policy dialogue and ownership by the aid recipient. 
 
During the early 1990s emphasis in aid delivery in Vietnam was clearly on the project modality, 
which corresponded very well with established economic planning and management systems in 
Vietnam. However, as the number of donors and the volume of aid started increasing later on in the 
1990s, concerns about mounting difficulties in disbursing funds spread. The response was not to 
move away from projects per se. They continue to this date to account for a major share of aid in-
flows, and according to the so-called Decree 17, Vietnam actually continues to perceive of all aid as 
“projects”.21 However, efforts have been made in recent years to try to improve coordination and 
start focusing on underlying institutional and policy issues of particular importance to aid dis-
bursements and effectiveness. For example, the major multilateral development banks operating in 
Vietnam began a process of more active consultation on implementation and disbursements and 
also the bilateral donors have participated in a variety of harmonization and joint working initia-
tives. 
 
Much has been achieved in Vietnam in improving the way in which projects are managed and im-
plemented, but it is widely agreed among donors and in the GoV that there are considerable transac-
tions costs associated with the project mode of operation, and coordination among donors is far 
from ideal. Efforts to find alternatives to conventional project approaches have therefore been 
mounting, reflecting both local conditions and experiences in Vietnam as well as the international 
aid debate. 
 
                                                 
21 A corollary hereof is that when Vietnamese authorities argue for increased “ownership” this should not necessarily 
be interpreted as an argument for programme aid. What is in question is typically an insistence on the desirability of a 
greater degree of local execution of projects. 
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Quick disbursing loans do not of course amount to a new area of activity for the IMF. In fact, this 
has been at the core of IMF lending to developing countries for decades. However, the IMF PRGF 
and the World Bank PRSC, which is co-financed with bilateral donors, is appropriately perceived as 
a new generation of budget support. The IMF focuses on macroeconomic and fiscal issues, and in 
line with the IMF mode of operation, does not invite other donors into its dialogue with the GoV. 
On the other hand, the PRSC is explicitly defined and structured with a view to provide bilateral 
donors with an option to participate with the World Bank in high-level macro and sector policy dis-
cussions with the GoV. 
 
Organising multi-donor interaction with the GoV is far from easy, but is facilitated by the fact that 
the World Bank manages the PRSC process in-country. Moreover, the World Bank’s role is key 
both since it is an important donor in quantitative terms but also because it commands the most in-
tellectual and management resources.  The Bank is also well placed to make good use of other 
documents such as the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) papers (see for example World Bank, 
2004) in the PRSC process. Aligning oneself with this process as a bilateral donor opens up for the 
possibility of being able to better monitor and assess ongoing developments in Vietnam, and it pro-
vides an avenue of interaction with the World Bank, which is fundamentally different from the way 
in which the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s were designed and implemented.  
 
It is also to be noted that the World Bank has been highly receptive to proposals from bilateral do-
nors in the formulation of policy matrices and outlining agendas for the dialogue with the GoV. 
These advantages should in no way be dismissed as minor, since they offer the bilateral donors a 
way of influencing the course of events. The PRSC process can also potentially offer both a bridge 
between developments at the macro level and efforts at sector and project levels. In addition, the 
PRSC is a country level mechanism geared at improved interaction, understanding and balance be-
tween the multilateral and bilateral agencies as well as between the donors and the recipient gov-
ernment. However, effective use of all this does of course presume that bilateral donors are in a po-
sition to play an active role, and it is also clear that the effectiveness of the dialogue will depend on 
the individual characteristics and abilities of out-posted staff at the World Bank office. While varia-
tion cannot be avoided, it is evident that the present situation in Vietnam is satisfactory, and Den-
mark has built up good experiences with the assignment of Danish nationals in the Bank office. It 
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would appear sensible to build on these experiences as the process of defining future PRSCs 
evolves. 
 
In sum, there are significant potential advantages of participating in the PRSC process as a bilateral 
donor. However, this does not of course relieve the donors from having to consider very carefully 
proposed plans and initiatives. Moreover, while it is widely agreed that the project modality is asso-
ciated with significant transactions costs and subtle issues of harmonization, it should not be over-
looked that coordination among donors involved in programme aid is also demanding. Moreover, 
there are also disadvantages associated with programme aid. One dimension is that once budget 
support is relied on, it is hard to escape a complex and insufficiently understood set of issues related 
to auditing, monitoring and evaluation of aid impact. First of all, assessments of public financial 
management are still developing. Even though the donors use several assessment instruments such 
as the World Bank PER, CFAA and CPAR, the IMF Fiscal ROSC, the joint WB and IMF HIPC 
AAP and EU audits, these instruments do not give full coverage. In particular, none of the instru-
ments provides an entirely satisfactory measure of fiduciary risk. Moreover, in some assessments, a 
large element of judgement based on country specific knowledge is involved and institutional and 
governance considerations need to be addressed in a more systematic way. Second, there is a poten-
tial conflict between the need for government ownership and the robustness of an assessment. This 
conflict is especially relevant to financial accountability assessments (Allen et. al, 2004). 
 
In addition, a small bilateral donor like Denmark will have to decide on the extent to which it 
wishes to rely on assessments of budget support initiatives carried out by multilateral institutions, 
including first of all the World Bank. If it is decided to rely extensively on the Bank, this will un-
doubtedly raise questions about who monitors and controls the Bank. One option could be that 
Denmark specializes in one or two key areas such as corruption where assessments by different or-
ganizations have reached widely dissimilar conclusions. 
 
Tony Killick (2004) puts these kinds of topics into an even broader framework in his review of how 
to monitor partnership-based aid relationships. He notes: “At the moment, however, all monitoring 
and evaluation at the country level is by donors of recipients, raising the question, who will monitor 
the donors?”. He goes on to review experiences from Tanzania, where jointly conducted and spon-
sored aid reviews carried out by independent groups drawn from the recipient country and from 
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outside are relied on. Moreover, Killick concludes that the Tanzanian model could readily be 
adopted in other aid-dependent countries. 
 
It is beyond the scope of the present report to come up with a more comprehensive review of the 
above issues to which it would appear there are no easy answers. Finally, on the above background 
it is evident that not only macroeconomic budget support should be pursued as an essential instru-
ment in the aid toolkit. Targeted programme support and similar initiatives need to be factored into 
a comprehensive support programme, in due course. 
 
4.4 Specific Suggestions for Danish Support 
Based on the overview and analysis presented in Section 2-4, it is recommended that Danida goes 
ahead with the formulation of a multi-year programme of budget support to Vietnam, linking this 
support to the PRSC-process. Budget support would enhance the mutual trust building and further 
demonstrate the Danish engagement in Vietnam’s development process in a convincing manner. 
Such a step would also serve as a way to promote a promising partnership based approach to the 
building of better governance and it would in particular help strengthen the general government sys-
tems for budget planning, implementation and auditing. There are also various advantages to 
Danida of being an integral player in the PRSC process, including access to information and being 
able to play a more active and direct role in the policy dialogue. 
 
It is evident that there are fiduciary risks involved in providing budget support to Vietnam, as trans-
parency is only gradually improving. However, significant progress has been recorded in recent 
years. The World Bank CAS (2002) notes that the PER (2000), the CFAA (2001) and the CPAR 
(2002) have all led to important initiatives for change, and the MOF has recently agreed to publish 
the complete state budget including expenditure on defence and national security. This implies that 
all components of the budget will be publicly available starting from fiscal year 2005. In addition, 
the forthcoming PER-IFA can be expected to help ensure that relevant proposals are formulated as 
to how this dimension can be managed in an acceptable manner. The donor community is in any 
case so heavily involved in the reform process that should the process “go astray” this will rela-
tively quickly be uncovered and taken up with the GoV.  
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In sum, there are many reasons why budget support is a modality that should be pursued within the 
framework of an overall Danish programme of development cooperation with Vietnam. We wish to 
stress, however, that we perceive budget support as one modality to be used alongside more tradi-
tional programme and project support, not as the only or exclusive modality to be considered. Thus: 
 
• Specific suggestion number 1: we propose that Denmark establishes a multi-year pro-
gramme of budget support to Vietnam, where general funds are disbursed as co-financing of 
the forthcoming PRSCs coordinated by the World Bank. The exact size of the funding to be 
disbursed as general budget can be decided upon in light of the overall framework of Danish 
aid to Vietnam, but a relative share of around 10 percent would probably be sensible, with 
explicit criteria as to how low, base and high levels of disbursements can be achieved. 
 
It is evident that general untied budget support can in principle be used by the GoV in accordance 
with its own budgetary processes and priorities. As indicated above, these are likely to reflect in an 
acceptable manner the mutual understanding reached with the international community. Yet, it 
would in all likelihood be a valuable signal of priorities if Denmark were to include in due course 
specific support to the targeted programmes as part of the overall budget support programme.22 
This would also be in line with the priorities inherent in the five-year rolling plan (A World of Dif-
ference) for the allocation of aid issued by the Danish Government. This plan pays particular atten-
tion to the 2015 Millennium Development goals established by the UN, with a focus on health and 
education. These are exactly the areas and aims being promoted through the targeted programmes, 
which have a distinct focus on alleviating poverty among the poorest of the poor. Thus:  
 
• Specific suggestion number 2: we propose that Denmark takes an active role in the targeted 
programmes, which are presently being evaluated and revised by the GoV. Following an 
appropriate assessment, Denmark should provide funding explicitly directed to these activi-
ties. Danida may also wish to consider assuming a supporting technical role in the imple-
mentation of such activities. However, Danida should agree and discuss with the GoV to en-
sure that such a financial contribution would be additional to the overall targeted pro-
gramme support already being planned, rather than displace it. 
                                                 
22 They include for example the Hunger Eradication Programme (HEPR) and the Health Care Fund for the Poor 
(HCFP). For a detailed overview of these programmes, see VDR 2004. 
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 There is no “water proof” way in which Danida can guarantee complete additionality a priori. Fun-
gibility of aid resources will remain an issue and judgement is inescapable, for budget as well as 
project modalities of aid. Promoting an effective policy dialogue between the GoV and the donor 
community geared towards establishing common aims and a high degree of mutual understanding 
of what aid resources should be used for is, however, in all likelihood the best way to promote addi-
tionality and ensure that resources are allocated to target sectors, regions and people. Furthermore, 
with the ongoing measures taken to improve transparency around public financial management as 
discussed in Section 3, the amount of data and information, which can help support in depth ex post 
assessments of any discrepancies between declared goals and actual behaviour of the GoV, is on a 
distinct increase. The ongoing PER-IFA can be consulted in due course for further background and 
suggestions on these issues, but in our assessment existing risks are manageable and the direction of 
change is clearly appropriate. 
 
Finally, there is reason to highlight that Denmark, the sixth largest donors in Vietnam, could take a 
higher profile role in the activities related to the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of 
the CPRGS and PRSCs. Relevant indicators and methods for data collection (such as household 
surveys) have been identified for these initiatives. Yet, data collection and analysis demands experi-
enced analytical staff both on side of the GoV and on the donor side. Greater availability of such 
personnel could play a key role in furthering better and more consistent understanding of past per-
formance and promoting greater visibility about the future based on sound economic analysis.  Such 
strengthening is also necessary for the formulation of appropriate policy advice and action steps to 
be taken in the policy dialogue with the GoV. Therefore: 
 
• Specific suggestion number 3: we recommend that Danida takes steps to strengthen the ana-
lytical capacity available for the monitoring and evaluation of the CPRGS and the PRSC 
processes. This could involve the active use of competent Danish researchers, and it would 
be advisable with at least one or two out-posted staff who could perform these duties. An 
added benefit hereof would be that they could be available to interact on a continuous basis 
with the Danish Embassy on how Danish priorities and views on the reform process may be 
effectively furthered vis-à-vis both the GoV and other donors. 
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5  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Since 1986, Vietnam has made truly remarkable progress in terms of growth and poverty allevia-
tion, demonstrating both national determination and will to overcome the formidable social, eco-
nomic and political challenges which Vietnam has had to face over the years. Admittedly, Vietnam 
has to some extent benefited from being able to harvest the “low hanging fruits” (VDR 2004) asso-
ciated with land reform and providing peasants with an appropriate incentive framework. As such it 
is worthwhile to be cautious when looking to the future. Future advances may not be quite as “easy” 
to achieve, and donors would do well to incorporate this into their expectations. Yet, past perform-
ance and assessments of the readiness of Vietnam to move forward certainly promise that develop-
ment will be dynamic in the years to come, and there is undoubtedly a potentially important and 
constructive role for foreign aid to play in this process. 
 
After a reluctant start in the 1980s, the international community became heavily involved in large-
scale investment programmes in Vietnam during the 1990s, and has by now also assumed responsi-
bility for supporting a wide variety of social and economic reform initiatives. The determination of 
Vietnam to maintain “ownership” of the reform process is evident, and aid conditionality as tradi-
tionally applied in the donor-recipient relationship would not only be misplaced but outright coun-
terproductive in Vietnam. However, patient dialogue, bargaining, and technical advice have proven 
to be effective ways of engaging the Vietnamese authorities and people. The CG framework is by 
no means unique to Vietnam, but it has spawned an unusually large and vigorous set of “partnership 
groups” of varying degree of formality, as pointed out in this report. Some of these groups have 
been highly successful, especially those in which the Vietnamese have taken an active part, and 
they document the willingness of Vietnam to interact and move forward in an effective manner 
when the framework is mutually agreed and understood. In sum, Vietnam has performed very well 
in growth and poverty reduction and has demonstrated both capacity and political will to take a dy-
namic and forward-looking role in the reform process. Vietnam also appears in her own way eager 
to learn from the interaction with the donor community and adapt future policies accordingly. This 
is not only important for the effectiveness of foreign aid in Vietnam, but is potentially also of inter-
est more broadly as the lessons learned in Vietnam may eventually be relied on elsewhere. 
 
Given the Vietnamese context outlined in the present report, the PRSC-approach does come across 
as a potentially useful tool for pursuing continuous policy dialogue with the GoV. The PRSC has to 
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a large extent served as a stock taking exercise in the past, and the demarcation lines to more tradi-
tional conditionality and reward mechanisms are not entirely clear. There is no doubt reason to in-
vest more in sustained long-run policy dialogue. Nevertheless, the PRSC does provide a macro-
level partnership forum in which key issues related to the use and assessment of aid and public fi-
nances as well as governance more broadly can be discussed. This is crucial. Given the hierarchical 
structure of the Vietnamese governing institutions, it is strategically important for the donor com-
munity to have a constructive dialogue at the level of core ministries such as MPI, MOF and SBV 
in addition to line ministries and regional and local governing bodies. Moreover, with proper prior-
ity and care the policy matrices can be further developed so as to provide a forward-looking agenda 
for policy reform. While this is easier said than done given the human resource constraints faced by 
many donors at country level, this is undoubtedly an avenue worth pursuing. 
 
Furthermore, while considerable capacity exists in Vietnam when it comes to the implementation of 
traditional projects, Vietnam has much to learn about how a modern, market-oriented State is run, 
including the need for fiscal transparency and effective budget preparation, implementation and au-
diting. In this context, budget support is a key instrument alongside more traditional aid modalities 
since better public sector management and experience with handling budget support in its various 
forms can arguably go a long way in enhancing the overall systemic impact of the resource transfer, 
which the budget support represents by itself. Danish budget support to Vietnam within the PRSC 
framework would also allow Denmark improved and continuous access to information and policy 
interaction at central government level and in relation to multilateral donor institutions. The value 
of feedback effects hereof to the overall and very sizeable programme supported by Denmark in 
Vietnam should not be underestimated, and the interaction with institutions such as the World Bank 
in Vietnam would offer a platform for Danish views and priorities influencing the way in which the 
reform agenda is phrased and pursued. 
 
Finally, as discussed in Section 4, it is recommended that Denmark engages herself in the following 
specific ways in the PRSC over the coming years: 
 
• General untied budget support within the PRSC framework 
• Support to the targeted programmes in due time 
• Strengthening of the analytical capacity to monitor and assess the CPRGS and PRSC  
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Annex 1: Terms of Reference 
 
Initialer kontor journalnummer dato 
ME BFT.5  3. februar 2004 
 
 
   
TERMS OF REFERENCE for 
Feasibility study concerning possible future budget support and 
support to complementary activities  
 
 
Background 
Vietnam has during the last decade or so sustained both a high economic growth rate and significant 
reduction in absolute poverty – by about 50 percent.  This has been achieved on the background of 
macroeconomic policies that have helped stabilise the economy with low inflation, sustainable 
budget deficits, and economic and structural reform efforts in areas such as the land reform and the 
emphasis on education.  Furthermore, Vietnam has enjoyed stable support from the international fi-
nancial institutions and bilateral donors. Efforts to improve effectiveness, efficiency, transparency 
and accountability have also been initiated during the period, although there still remain key chal-
lenges in these areas. 
 
The challenge for Vietnam and for the development co-operation between Vietnam and Denmark is 
to keep the momentum in economic growth and in poverty reduction in the years to come.  This 
may require more focus on increasing the effectiveness and efficiency in the public sector, on im-
proving the regulatory environment for the private sector, including development of financial in-
termediation, and on measures to sustain poverty reduction.  There may also be a need for an im-
proved capacity to monitor development in economic development and poverty in Vietnam in gen-
eral and at the provincial level and an improved capacity to analyse data and make adequate poli-
cies based upon analysis of the data. 
 
Denmark has for a number of years co-financed with the World Bank and DFID, Sweden and Neth-
erlands the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits.  The aim has been to strengthen focus on poverty 
reduction in Vietnam’s policies and public sector budgets. 
 
This study will provide a technical basis for possible future multi-year budget support to Vietnam 
and support for capacity building, which will promote a poverty reduction focus in Vietnam’s poli-
cies and budget allocations in the future.   
 
 
Objectives 
The objectives of the feasibility study will be  
 
• An assessment of the feasibility of continued multi-year budget support to Vietnam and 
supplementary support to public sector reform in support of poverty reduction. 
• Well documented/argued suggestions for possible Danish budget support and support to 
public sector reform in support of poverty reduction. 
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The outputs of the feasibility study will be 
 
• A desk study based upon existing documentation from the Government of Vietnam, the World 
Bank etc. by 15 March 
• A feasibility report, including a 5 pages summary of findings and recommendations on future 
Danish budget support to Vietnam and support to public sector reform in support of poverty re-
duction, by 1 May 
• A draft programme document for Danish multi-year budget support and support for key areas 
public sector reform for poverty reduction, by 15 June 
 
Scope of Work 
 
The scope of work will at least include (reference is also made to Danida guidance note on provi-
sion of budget support http://amg.dynamicweb.dk/default.asp?ID=99 ) 
 
- Short description of the growth and poverty developments, status and outlook in Vietnam, includ-
ing provincial differences 
 
- An assessment of the macro economic situation 
 
- An assessment of the extent to which the budget - and actual spending and taxation – is pro-poor, 
instruments in place to ensure a pro-poor bias in the budget 
 
- An assessment of the proposed PRSC 3/4,  
 
- An assessment of fiduciary risks related to the provision of budget support 
 
- An assessment of the public sector reform process with focus on areas relevant for effective poli-
cies and programmes for poverty reduction. 
 
- Suggestions for Danish support to public sector reforms that are crucial to growth and poverty re-
duction and related governance. 
 
Team 
The Team will consist of  
 
Finn Tarp, consultant, team leader 
Henrik Hansen, consultant, economist 
....; national consultant, economist 
....; konsulent til at bistå med skrivningen af programdokument? 
 
Morten Elkjaer, TAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs will take part in part of the mission. 
 
 
Organisation of work and time schedule 
The work will be divided in phases.   
Phase 1: A draft desk study will be ready by 15 March 
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Comments on the study will be provided by 1st April to feed into the feasibility study and pos-
sible adjustment of these TOR 
Phase 2: Mission to Hanoi: 29 March – 2 April. Draft mission report (feasibility study and out-
line of proposal for budget support and capacity building for relevant activities) by 1 May.  
Comment on draft by 15th May 
It is foreseen that a 1-2 week mission to Vietnam will be undertaken during May-June.  
Updated study and draft proposal for multi-year budget support and support to public sector 
refom in support of poverty reduction will be ready by 15 June 
 
 
5. februar 2004  Morten Elkjær 
Dato   TSA sagsbehandler (underskrift/navnestempel) 
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